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Updated: Fri May 16 04:19:50 UTC 2008
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Is This
the Future
for
Australia's
Military Capabilities?
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The fall of the Singapore
garrison in 1942 represents a globally accepted case study of the
consequences of
military incompetence
(Image AWM 135867)
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Military history around the
world, from distant
to recent times, has been littered with examples of well-researched
advice from qualified sources being ignored both at the military
level by General-ranking officers and at the political level. In too
many cases, this rejection of reality has resulted directly in a
needless loss of military personnel and precious equipment. In
extreme cases, battles have been lost and national sovereignty put at
risk.
From the military point of view, this occurs
sometimes through a lack of understanding of what they are being
told. At other times, they may be well aware of what they are being
told, but it is rejected as being in conflict with non-military
'imperatives' that they see as having to take precedence over sound
military judgement. Such 'imperatives' usually come from the Defence
bureaucracy or through the political net, often both. In all cases,
however, they result in non-military pressures distorting sound
military judgement.
The
British Experience.
Turning to the British Military, which
suffered
our Defence Reform Programme (DRP)-type structural changes a few
years earlier than the ADF, we find that a most disturbing pattern of
behaviour has developed within the military hierarchy and the
bureaucratic/political levels. The situation within the British
defence organisation has been raised recently by General Sir Michael
Rose, former head of the SAS, ex-commander of UN forces in Bosnia,
and formerly in charge of standards in the British Army as Adjutant
General. (See
'Washington's War' by Michael Rose).
His assessment is that Britain has witnessed
the
most catastrophic collapse of its military ethos in recent history.
While he is concerned particularly with the impacts of the imposition
of ‘politically-correct’ European Union (EU) legislation
emanating from Brussels, he is disturbed about the effects of the war
in Iraq which he maintains has broken the military chain of command,
caused generals and chiefs to lose the trust of their men,
disorientated soldiers, and destroyed the trust between civilian
society and the armed forces. To remedy this, he sees a need to get
rid of those 'top brass' who kowtow to Whitehall, and to distance
military decisions from politics from wherever it emanates.
Rose feels that at the heart of the reported
confrontation between RN and Iranian forces in the Gulf were a
corruption of military ethos and a loss of moral authority. He also
cites compelling reports generated by young officers giving the true
situation in Iraq being 'binned' by the Brigadier because he wanted
promotion. He points to the politicisation of the military,
resulting in generals not speaking out, causing confusion in the
chain of command, and undermining the trust one needs from one's men.
The Commanding Officer, he adds, used to be a feared and respected
figure. Now, when he makes some disciplinary judgement, it can be
overridden by civilians.
To remedy the situation, Rose believes that
it
is vital to retrain and recover. In particular, the Army needs its
own jurisdiction, administration, discipline, ethos, and all these
things have to be different from civilians, and outside their
meddling.
The General's comments, of course, related
in
principle to all three British Services.
The
Canadian Experience [1].
Turning to Canada, where their Defence Force
was
re-formed before both the UK and Australia, the situation seems to be
even worse than that described by General Rose:
The military structures that foster and
sustain
the complex attitudes and behaviours amongst military members, which
evolved over centuries and were certainly present in Canada, but have
for some time been impacted by organisations “that reward
conformity over capability, allowing the slow rise of petty
authoritarians into positions of control”. The Military ethos is
not understood within the Canadian Parliament, or by the media, and
the intelligentsia refuses to recognise its existence.
Unfortunately, this also seems to be true
amongst senior officers. The ethos has been warped and perverted at
times (not least in the Airborne Regiment in 1992-93), indicative of
a failing leadership even at junior ranks. “The Military
should be turning out men accustomed to hardihood, ready to inflict
and receive harm, accustomed to rewarding trust and respect while
being trusted and respected in turn. This is not happening now”.
Instead, the Military is now expected to be
more
conformist in line with notional ideals, certainly not sexist or
ageist, recruitment and training standards have been dropped, and
officers are saddled with environmental impact reports and have to
undergo ‘sensitivity training’, a poor substitute for
common decency. Canadians ask: “If officers shun personal
responsibility for the actions of those under their command, is this
not seen also in so many other Canadian institutions?”
“Indeed, for 30 years, Canadians have
stressed individual rights, entitlements, and privileges, while
disavowing the concepts of duty, obligation, and personal
responsibility. For years, perception has been more important than
reality and substance yields first place to appearance. These tenets
have dominated public discourse for so long, Canadians ask if it is
any wonder that many officers who rise to General and Flag rank abide
by them?”
“The shirking of individual
responsibility and the importance of appearance are leading traits
among the incompetent, as outlined by Dixon. Worse still, too much
of the Military’s current leadership is increasingly inclined
to micromanaging every aspect of military life, making the domination
of the Armed Forces by the incompetent that much closer. More than
ever, Canadian soldiers are expected to be in conformity with
Canada’s increasingly twisted values.”
The
Australian Experience?
While Britain and Canada have had a few more
years and a few more major conflicts during which their problems have
developed, Australia's post-defence reform structure is showing the
development of identical trends, and it is imperative that these
trends be checked and checked brutally if we are not to go down the
same path.
Although there is some evidence that the
problems besetting the British and Canadian Military have penetrated
to the operational elements of the ADF, a measure of degree cannot be
made with complete confidence. The well-respected Australian Defence
Association (ADA) in its Autumn 2007 'Defender' magazine notes that
the excessive secrecy about what our troops are doing and why has
greatly exacerbated community disengagement from their defence force
on a day-to-day basis, as well as their ignorance in military
matters. It adds that tactical incidents are sensationalised and
judged unfairly, using peacetime moral absolutes, political biases,
or ideological fixations. In its Winter 2007 magazine, ADA also
highlighted problems with our Military Justice System which in its
present form plays a significant role in debasing the ethics of our
ADF. Finally, the fine art of obfuscation, misinformation, and
'spin' developed by Defence as its prime defensive strategy against
anything smacking of public or parliamentary criticism has resulted
in a feeling of deep distrust amongst those who try to debate with
them. These conditions all dictate against the facts becoming known.
The situation is not helped by the aggressive, personal denigration to
which senior Defence officials too often resort as a counter to any
form of criticism, real or implied, or no matter how well intended.
However, any true measure of the state of
health
of the ADF should not start at the lowest fighting level. If serious
problems are found there, then it is far too late; the organisation
has already failed completely. The core of a service's effectiveness
lies in the strength of its morale and ethos, and both of these drip
down from above-they do not well up from below. Furthermore, in
order to maintain morale and ethos, the spring feeding them must be
well tendered and refreshed with leaders selected carefully for very
special qualities, not only for their professionalism, but also for
their loyalty, integrity, leadership, courage, and moral fibre. If
those at the higher levels of a service (say at one, two and three
star ranks), do not demonstrate these qualities in all matters and at
all times then their Service will wither through a lack of trust and
respect all the way down the chain of command.
Before the imposition of the Tange
structural
changes of 1974, there were few instances of bureaucratic
interference in military matters that impacted ethos and morale as
each service head was accountable to parliament through his minister
and the Minister was advised also by his Secretary who sat on the
Service Board of management. Not unexpectedly, there were some
political pressures, but these were able to be handled, as well as
could be, by the Minister concerned within Cabinet. These clear
lines of delegation and accountability, together with the short and
direct organisational links between the Service Head
and the Minister, the Service Head and the Secretary,
and between all and the Cabinet and the other upper levels of
Defence machinery provided responsive, sound, and timely advice on
service matters to those who needed to know.
The Tange changes, together with the
sweeping
changes imposed later by Government direction through the Defence
Reform Program introduced a confused overlapping of the military and
a vastly inflated bureaucracy, with the military placed in roles
subservient to the will of the public service bureaucracy. Despite
continual reviews and reports, the dysfunctional Defence organisation
created has only grown larger, adding more and more layers to an
already complex bureaucracy.
What has not been well recognised, and often
overtly ignored, has been the insidious impact of this structure upon
the higher management of the Services, and the consequential adverse
impact down the Service chain of command, much as was described by
General Rose and experienced in Canada. These problems have been
raised by very few senior military officers and none has taken a firm
stand in the defence of his service while serving.
The warning signs have been surfacing over
the
years, but have not been heeded by the Services, the bureaucracy, or
government. Here, we look at only a few of the practices that have
developed since the imposition of defence reform, the consequent
downsizing and de-skilling of the Services, and the imposition of
civilian control:
The kowtowing to our equivalent of
Whitehall
by senior officers seeking to curry favour for future
promotion. While the pressures placed inevitably on senior
officers and service heads working within civilian bureaucracies are
generally known, it is critical that military input be voiced
strongly and unambiguously, without fear. Molding military input to
accommodate bureaucratic or political 'imperatives' immediately
compromises both the officer and his input. An officer who yields to
such pressure or temptation places himself in serious conflict of
interest which can impact defence planning adversely and, as
recent history shows, does. He does
himself, his service and his country no good. Those who apply such
pressures on the spoken or unspoken threat of
influencing future
promotion are, of course, equally guilty.
Senior officers contributing to or
accepting
silently bureaucratic/political decisions knowing them to be false or
misleading. The bureaucracy, having taken a decision will
constrain all concerned, including service officers, to adopt it as
the 'party line'. Having become a willing or unwilling party to the
Department's position, service officers are further constrained to
defend often indefensible decisions within their own organisation. A
by-product is that those down the chain of command have also to be
directed to support the 'party line'. Those voicing doubt,
dissatisfaction, or disagreement may also be reminded that their
dissent will jeopardise their future careers.
Senior officers failing to stand up and
defend their men when they have fallen foul of the bureaucracy as a
result of standing firm on important matters influencing their
service. There
is nothing more calculated to destroy morale than senior officers,
both within and outside the Defence bureaucracy, not standing up for
their men, particularly when it is evident that they have been
victimised unjustly. In most cases, this will lead to the loss of
officers and men who, in fact, demonstrated those vitally needed
characteristics lacking in the senior officer.
These few characteristics carry the seeds
for
multiple problems down the chain of command, diluting the morale and
ethos of the services. The end result is that a service will be
progressively unable to develop future heads of service and senior
ranks with the loyalty, integrity, leadership, courage, and moral
fibre so sorely needed.
All Service Heads and their senior officers
should perhaps conduct a personal audit to see if they have fallen
into the bureaucratic trap and are contributing to the demise of
military ethics within their service. Hopefully, we may see more
service heads and senior officers standing firm on military matters. For their
part, those in the bureaucracy might well
remember that those
selecting service heads and senior officers should demonstrate the
same characteristics that must be sought in those being considered
for promotion.
In the end, it is critical that the new
Labor
Government, as part of its review of Defence matters, focuses closely
on the structural weaknesses that have led Australia down paths
similar to those trodden by the UK and Canada. If this problem is
not remedied, then all else achieved will come to naught. |
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Endnotes:
[1] The
comments that follow have been cited from Norman Dixon’s highly
respected study ‘On the Psychology of Military Incompetence’,
as reported by the Mackenzie Institute of Canada in its article
‘Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing’, which may be found at
www.mackenzieinstitute.com.
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Air Power Australia
Analyses ISSN 1832-2433
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Artwork, graphic design and text © 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 Carlo Kopp; Text © 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 Peter Goon; All
rights reserved. |
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