|Last Updated: Mon Jan 27 11:18:09 UTC 2014|
Legacy Air Defence System Upgrades
Technical Report APA-TR-2009-0601
Kopp, AFAIAA, SMIEEE, PEng
Updated July, 2009
Updated May, August 2011
Updated April, 2012
Text © 2009-2012 Carlo Kopp
Air Defence Weapons were one of the primary exports of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact during the Cold War era. They were supplied as often as commercial products to well moneyed nations unfriendly to the West, as they were supplied as subsidised military aid to developing nations and Soviet satellite nations. Vast quantities of the S-75 Dvina / SA-2 Guideline, S-125 / SA-3 Goa, 2K12 Kub/Kvadrat / SA-6 Gainful, 9K33 Romb/Osa / SA-8 Gecko and 9K31 Strela 1 / SA-9 Gaskin were manufactured and exported.
When the Soviet Empire collapsed at the end of the Cold War, the global inventory of former Soviet SAM systems, and associated radars and support equipment, became an important source of revenue vital to the survival of the enormous military-industrial complex spread across former Soviet Republics and former Warsaw Pact nations. Both manufacturers and overhaul depots competed for business in providing spare parts, as well as radar, missile and equipment repairs and overhauls.
The massive drawdown of the former Soviet and Warsaw Pact military machine also produced a surplus of equipment and warehoused warstocks of missiles and spare parts, much of which appeared on the global arms market at often bargain basement prices.
A decade after the Cold War, technology insertion programmes and upgrades began to appear in the market. There were partly driven by market demands for better capabilities in their air defence systems, but also partly driven by increasing difficulties in manufacturing obsolete technologies in a dramatically downsized industrial base. A prominent feature of many upgrades has been the complete replacement of hardwired analogue electronics with new digital software based equipment, using COTS technology from the global marketplace.
Two decades after the Cold War, the upgrade business is booming, and presents a major competitor to sales of new build air defence systems. This should not be surprising, as a survey of disclosed sales of the S-300PMU / SA-20 Gargoyle series SAM system puts the cost per battery at US$100 million to US$200 million, depending on configuration and reload stock quantities ordered.
For many users the additional lethality and coverage footprint of new generation SAMs like the S-300PMU1/2 and S-300VM becomes less attractive given the price tag, and they opt for upgrades to often substantial existing national investments in Soviet era air defence hardware.
In terms of direct upgrades to legacy systems, the most prominent have been the various packages developed for the semi-mobile S-125 Pechora/Neva / SA-3 Goa and its SNR-125 Low Blow engagement radar. Upgrades are also available for the S-200 Angara/Vega/Dubna / SA-5 Gammon and its 5N62 Square Pair engagement radar, as well as the 2K12 Kub/Kvadrat / SA-6 Gainful, the 9K33 Romb/Osa / SA-8 Gecko, and the 9K35 Strela 10 / SA-13 Gopher.
These upgrades parallel a very similar trend observed in widely deployed legacy Soviet era early warning, search and acquisition radars. Upgrade packages are on offer for the P-14 Tall King, P-15 Flat Face, P-18 Spoon Rest, and P-35/37 Big Bar / Big Mesh / Bar Lock series.
The more sophisticated upgrades increase the capability of these systems, with many examples increasing radar performance, jam resistance and track capabilities, and some examples improving either mobility of the system, or the kinematic range of the missiles.
From a Western perspective, the global proliferation of upgrades presents new and often difficult challenges. Western nations have an enormous material and intellectual investment in electronic warfare equipment, and emitter databases, crafted around the idiosyncrasies of legacy Soviet era SAM system and radar designs. Replacement of the original electronics with new digital technology will more than often instantly obsolete much of this investment. Jamming techniques which may have been effective against an SNR-125 Low Blow emitting a narrowband carrier with manual channel selection are apt to be entirely ineffective against a digital rebuild of the same radar using automatic wideband pseudorandom frequency hopping and digital signal and data processing.
For convenience APA has defined the following nomenclature for upgrades of legacy Cold War era systems:
Class 1 Upgrades will involve the replacement of Soviet era electronic, electrical, electro-explosive and mechanical components which are obsoleted and no longer supportable, with current production equivalents. Such upgrades retain the capabilities and limitations of the original design, but extend its service life over the effective service life of the new components.
Class 2 Upgrades will involve the replacement of Soviet era electronic, electrical, electro-explosive and mechanical components which are obsoleted and no longer supportable, with current production equivalents, plus the replacement of key functional components such as radar receivers, transmitters, signal processors and data processors with modern digital equivalents. Such upgrades expand the capabilities and performance of the system, and more than often impact key EW parameters such as jam resistance, and radar detection range. As the original antennas and scan formats are retained, the design may still retain many of the electronic vulnerabilities of the original.
Class 3 Upgrades are mobility enhancements of Class 1 or 2 upgrades, where the launchers and often engagement radars are rehosted on new trailers, or rebuilt as fully self propelled units on new built chassis. Such upgrades alter the fundamental regime of deployment and vastly enhance survivability, especially where the mobility upgrade replaces cables with digital radio datalinks, and digital automation shortens deployment and stow times for the system, or the missile battery as a whole.
Class 4 Upgrades involved hybridisation, where an entirely new engagement radar, and often new acquisition radar, is introduced to fully supplant the legacy Soviet era radars characteristic of the weapon system. A Class 4 upgrade may be performed in parallel with a Class 1, 2 or 3 upgrade on the remaining system components.
Table 1 shows some examples of legacy systems and available upgrades:
Hybridisation will present a major issue in coming years, exacerbating challenges in defeating digital variants of Soviet era systems. A sophisticated long range phased array engagement radar such as the 30N6E2 Tomb Stone or 92N2E Grave Stone when mated with a legacy missile system such as the SA-2, SA-3, SA-5 or SA-6 completely transforms the capabilities of the legacy system. While the legacy missile round might be a stone axe by contemporary standards, it becomes a stone axe hurled with high precision by a highly survivable and jam resistant state-of-the-art sensor system.
In a sense, this development emulates the long established Western practice of mating smart digital seekers to legacy unguided munitions to transform their capabilities. The availability of modern active radar seekers for legacy SAM rounds in the 2K12 Kub/Kvadrat / SA-6 Gainful system in fact directly follows the Western technology insertion pattern, with similar transformational impact.
Upgrades to legacy air defence weapons are changing the air power game, as the Russians learned in Georgia during their 2008 adventure. A good number of Russian aircraft were shot down by Georgian SAM batteries, as their electronic countermeasures proved ineffective. What the Russians confronted in Georgia were legacy systems covertly upgraded with new hardware by Ukrainian defence contractors, active players in the global upgrade market.
The Russian experience in Georgia is a lesson which remains to be understood by Western defence bureaucracies.
Most of the known upgrades to legacy SAM systems involve replacement of analogue engagement radar, and often supporting acquisition radar, modules and components with modern technology COTS based digital replacements. Often thermionic technology transmitters and receivers are replaced with modern solid state components. This in itself typically provides significant gains in jam resistance, clutter rejection and detection range [sensitivity] for low signature targets. Moreover, improved clutter rejection typically improves tracking capability against low altitude targets, a particular weakness of most Cold War era Soviet designs. Improved control laws in command link guided weapons have also produced significant range envelope improvements.
To date seeker retrofits have been less common. This is for several reasons. The first and foremost is that most upgrades to date have been performed on SA-2 and SA-3 systems which are command link systems without terminal homing seekers, and the desire was to permit reuse of existing warstocks of missile rounds. The second reason has been cost, as a digital upgrade to an engagement radar incurs costs only against a small number of such devices, compared to hundreds or thousands of missile rounds in warstock. The additional operational flexibility and lethality gained has evidently been considered less important.
The Iraqi program to retrofit the R-60 Aphid infrared seeker to the 3M9 / SA-6 missile resulted from a very different imperative, which was lethality in an intensive countermeasures environment. The 3M9/9M9 missile has also been the target of Agat's seeker upgrade effort, with similar objectives to the Iraqi effort.
The 3M9/9M9 is an attractive candidate for retrofits, not only due to its wide installed base, but also because integration of a replacement for the existing 1SB4 semi-active homing seeker is a straightforward if not minimal effort. An adaptor must be produced to provide signal outputs which emulate those produced by the 1SB4, and inputs to the 1SB4 from the autopilot, and a power supply adaptor is required to condition the power supply intended for the 1SB4 to the new seeker. Only if the new seeker drew significantly more power would it be necessary to replace the existing missile internal power supply.
A more sophisticated replacement seeker design would contain an embedded modern FOG or RLG inertial module, possibly a GPS/Glonass receiver, a modern digital command link modem, but also replace the legacy autopilot and its embedded control laws.
Replacement of the legacy 5G22/5G23/5G24 CW semi-active homing radar seeker in the 5V21 and 5V28 / SA-5 Gammon missiles would follow a similar pattern and is also a low risk and low development cost effort.
The low cost and technological risk involved in performing a seeker block upgrade of this kind raises other issues, as it is conceivable that it could be performed covertly and present a "strategic surprise" scenario in combat.
Retrofits to legacy command link guided missiles are more challenging, insofar as both the S-75 / SA-2 and S-125 / SA-3 missile rounds would require more radical surgery, with the complete replacement of the radio proximity fuse, command link receiver, and autopilot. Whether the replacement seeker is infrared or active radar, the missile nosecone would need to be replaced and nose mounted hardware repackaged. Such an upgrade would however not only improve the lethality of the weapon, but also significantly extend its viable service life, with periodic relifing of solid propellants and pyrotechnics. Given the declining global inventory of the S-75 / SA-2, the S-125 / SA-3 is a more viable candidate.
In summary the technical risk and effort involved in seeker retrofits varies from low to modest, and given the significant lethality gains which result, we should not be surprised to encounter them in future conflicts.
Avtomatika L-112E anti-radiation seeker. This family of seekers employs a characteristic gimballed multiple baseline interferometer design which uses a cluster of seven wideband hemispherical spiral antennas, providing for pitch/yaw steering outputs and ambiguity resolution in both axes. The design is a credible candidate for larger SAM airframes such as the 48N6E series and 5V28 series (© 2009 Vitaliy V. Kuzmin).
The installation of anti-radiation seekers in SAM airframes is not a new idea. The PLA's FT-2000 anti-radiation SAM was built with a wideband anti-radiation seeker. Narrowband Home-On-Jam (HOJ) capability has been installed in a range of semi-active and active homing radar missile seekers, primarily intended to discourage active jamming of the missile seeker. The MIM-104B ASOJ Patriot variant is credited with such a capability.
There are no open source reports of dedicated anti-radiation seekers being installed in recent Russian SAM designs. A narrowband passive anti-radiation capability is likely in more recent semi-active and TVM capable seekers, as this capability exists in supersonic anti-shipping missile active radar seekers of similar size.
There are no fundamental technical obstacles to the retrofit of a wideband anti-radiation seeker to larger Russian SAM airframes, such as the 48N6, 9M82, 9M83 or legacy 5V28. Existing seekers such as the Avtomatika L-111E/112E/113E series used in subtypes of the Kh-31 / AS-17 Krypton anti-radiation missile are geometrically and volumetrically compatible with these SAM airframes. Guidance adaptations would not be particularly challenging where the missile employs midcourse command link / inertial guidance, the principal aim being to fly the missile into a viable acquisition basket for the seeker, and cue the seeker to acquire the intended emitter. Modern anti-radiation missile seekers are usually capable of autonomous target acquisition, or re-acquisition should an emitter go silent transiently.
The technology is certainly available to inexpensively equip any number of recent Russian SAM airframes with anti-radiation seekers. Passive targeting capability via emitter locating systems such as the 85V6 Vega / Orion or Kvant 1L222 Avtobaza presents no difficulty, both designs have been integrated with the S-400 / SA-21 fire control system. The CONOPS for such a system would involved passive angle tracking and ranging on an emitter, with the SAM round flown out under command link control to a geometrically optimal position, upon which the anti-radiation seeker would acquire the target and terminal homing would be performed. Existing control laws for terminal homing in HOJ modes would be viable.
Until terminal homing is initiated, a defending aircraft will have no easy means of determining whether an inbound SAM is fitted with an anti-radiation seeker. This will complicate defensive countermeasures scheduling and defensive tactics. A salvo of two SAMs, one with an anti-radiation seeker, and one with an active or semi-active homing seeker, will present similar difficulties to those seen with the use of mixed seeker types in Beyond Visual Range (BVR) AAM attacks.
Most upgrade packages offered for the S-75 / SA-2 Guideline involve technology insertion for the SNR-75 Fan Song engagement radar, which is otherwise highly vulnerable to Western countermeasures (Czech Army image).
The ubiquitous S-75 / SA-2 Guideline can claim the distinction of being the most widely exported area defence SAM system of all times. While now regarded to be obsolescent, it still remains widely used, with China still operating ~60 batteries. Each six launcher battery uses a single SNR-75 Fan Song / Gin Sling engagement radar. The missile round uses a liquid propellant terminal stage with a solid propellant first stage booster.
The PLA reverse engineered the Soviet V-75/S-75 Dvina / SA-2 Guideline SAM system during the 1960s, including the SNR-75 Fan Song radar, the SM-90 launcher and the PR-11AM transporter/transloader. Since then the PLA developed a significantly improved HQ-2B variant. China is reported to still be supplying spare parts for a number of operators, and is known to have supplied the system to Iran.
There are at this time a number of known upgrades on offer, and two known fully mobile TEL designs for the S-75, one developed by the Chinese and one by the Cubans.
Almaz-Antey launched in 2001 the Volga-2/2A package of technology insertion upgrades for the legacy S-75/75M designs, using digital components previously used in the S-300PMU1/2 / SA-20 Gargoyle.
Russian sources claim the following enhancements to the design via the use of new digital components: improved countermeasures resistance for the missile uplink and radar; automatic tracking modes for targets, extended kinematic range via better control law design, and cope with adverse ECM environments.
Specific claims include:
In 2003 Tetraedr in Belarus announced the development of the S-75-2T Volga-2T upgrade package for the S-75 / SA-2 system. This upgrade draws upon the technology base developed for upgrades of the S-125 / SA-3 system. It is not currently detailed on the Tetraedr website.
The upgrade package on offer is to provide a comprehensive technology replacement of all key components in the SNR-75 Fan Song engagement radar. Cited improvements include a reduction of the system down to two trailers, digital data and signal processing, new missile control laws to extend range, and a mobility upgrade with a 20 minute stow/deploy time.
Tetraedr also offer overhauls and zero timing of 20D and 5Ya23 missile rounds for the system.
The H-200 phased array engagement radar was developed to support the new HQ-12/KS-1A SAM system. Hybridisation of the H-200 radar and the existing HQ-2B/J missile system would transform the capabilities of the HQ-2, and open up a large export market for the H-200 and other Chinese radars (Chinese internet images).
Some evidence has emerged, albeit inconclusive as it is not supported by public disclosures, that the PLA may be hybridising its new HQ-12/KS-1A SAM system with the legacy HQ-2B/J / CSA-2 Guideline SAM system. The PLA remains the world's largest single user of the SA-2, with domestically re-engineered missile rounds and SJ-202 Gin Sling series engagement radars. The PLA has also deployed a fully mobile HQ-2 TEL on a tracked chassis. In practical terms the PLA has a large material and intellectual investment in the SA-2 family of weapons. Hybridising the HQ-2 and HQ-12 would therefore make sense economically as it would allow exploitation of the HQ-2 inventory and warstock until the type is wholly replaced by newer technology weapons.
As the HQ-2 is a simple command link guided missile, hybridisation with a newer missile system involves only the installation of software and hardware in the engagement radar which cues and commands the HQ-2B TELs or static SM-90 launchers, permits tracking of the missile, and which generates uplink commands to the missile during flight. With the Fan Song / Gin Sling operating at X-band (G/E/F depending on subtype), and given the robust antenna bandwidth available with a transmissive space feed PESA arrangement as used in the H-200 engagement radar for the HQ-12/KS-1A, there would be no fundamental technological obstacles to adapting the H-200 to provide a midcourse tracking and command uplink guidance capability for the HQ-2 / SA-2 missile round. It is worth observing that Chinese sources claim the predecessor to the KS-1A, the KS-1, employed the same Gin Sling engagement radar as the HQ-2B/J. If this is true, then the degree of commonality in missile electronics and waveforms between the KS-1A and HQ-2B/J could be very high, facilitating hybridisation.
A HQ-2B/J missile battery equipped with a modern frequency hopping H-200 engagement radar and a JY-11/JY-11B, YLC-18, JYL-1 acquisition radar becomes an entirely different proposition to the legacy article, in terms of its engagement envelope, tactical mobility, and its resistance to jamming.
Given the large number of existing users of the S-75 / SA-2 and HQ-2 / CSA-1 on the global stage, China could well have a major commercial motive to develop a hybrid domestically, since it would open a significant export market for the H-200 radar, and its competitor, the SJ-231, as well as replacement JY-11B, YLC-18 and JYL-1 acquisition radars.
WXZ204 HQ-2B TEL in deployed configuration.
A tracked TEL, the WXZ204, was developed to replace the cloned SM-90. The PLA remains the single largest user of the S-75 globally, even though the weapon is being progressively replaced. The tracked TEL chassis appears to be a unique design, but evidently using components from the Type 63 light amphibious tank, itself a derivative of the Soviet PT-76 [Click for more ...].
Cuban SA-2 TELs on parade in Havana, 2006 (via Vestnik-PVO).
Cuba has developed and deployed an indigenous TEL based on the Soviet SM-90 launcher and the obsolete T-55 tank chassis. The total number of conversions is unknown, but multiple TELs were publicly displayed during the 2006 Havana parade, and TELs have been displayed in two very different camouflage patterns suggesting multiple units equipped with the design. This design shares features with the Cuban SA-3 TEL design, and differs in many respects from the PLA HQ-2 TEL.
This image shows the wheeled support frame for the nose of the missile round, in stowed position for transport. This frame is removed from the TELs used for the street parade. This is a fundamentally different design approach to the WXZ204 HQ-2B TEL, where the launch rail was extended.
This image shows the cable spool mounted on the aft of the tank hull. This suggests that during deployment of the battery the TEL is used to lay the interface cable from the Fan Song. A similar arrangement is used on the Cuban SA-3 TEL (via Vestnik-PVO).
As with the S-75 / SA-2 Guideline, most upgrade packages offered for the S-125 / SA-3 Goa involve technology insertion for the SNR-125 Low Blow engagement radar, which is otherwise highly vulnerable to Western countermeasures (Czech Army image).
Following the end of the Cold War, a number of upgrade packages have emerged for the S-125 / SA-3 Goa, mostly involving digital upgrades to the radar and guidance package, but some involving rehosting on vehicles to provide a mobile rather than semi-mobile capability. The S-125 / SA-3 Goa has been a more attractive target for upgrades compared to the S-75 / SA-2 Guideline, as the missile is newer by design, and less cumbersome to support as both stages uses solid propellant motors.
Tetraedr's upgraded UNV-2T Low Blow for the Pechora 2T system.
Tetraedr have developed two upgrade packages, the Pechora 2T and further enhanced Pechora 2TM. These upgrades involve redesign of key radar components, a new upper antenna aperture, and revised autopilot software. For the Pechora 2T the cited improvement in jam resistance is 2700 W/MHz (AWGN) vs 24 W/MHz for the legacy design, suggesting the use of a frequency hopping design with a better than 100:1 spreading ratio. The Pechora 2TM uses an new trailer for the UNV-2TM Low Blow. A CPTЗ-125 seduction decoy is packaged into the upgrade. Deployment time is 20 minutes.
Tetraedr are offering a heavily upgraded UNV-2TM Low Blow on a new design towed chassis as part of the Pechora 2TM upgrade (© 2011 Michael Jerdev).
Above, below: Upgraded Tetraedr 5P73-2TM four rail launcher (© 2011 Michael Jerdev).
5V27 Goa missile launch
S-125 / SA-3 and S-125-2T Pechora 2T block upgrade firing trial results. The Pechora 2T is a characteristic of contemporary digital block upgrades to widely used Soviet era SAMs. The improved autopilot algorithm in the updated SNR-125 significantly extends the engagement envelope of the weapon system. The best range achieved was 16 NMI. Provisional data - Tetraedr JSC.
Launch of the upgraded Pechora-2M from an MZKT-8022 TEL (Defense Systems).
Russian and ByeloRussian industry via a joint company, Oboronitelnye Sistemy, developed the Pechora 2M upgrade package using a wheeled TEL, and the system was exported to Egypt in 2006. The system is designed to deploy and stow in 25 minutes. The upgraded 5V27D and 5V27DE missiles feature new fuses and warheads, and the electronics have been comprehensively upgraded with digital hardware, an electro-optical tracker has been added. An interesting feature of this design is that the 5P71 launcher has been transplanted on to a 6 x 6 MZKT-8022 truck, as has the SNR-125 Low Blow engagement radar. Egypt is cited as the first export client.
Rosoboronexport Description (Cite):
The modernisation programme for the S-125 Pechora air defence missile system developed by the Kuntsevo Design Bureau, involves two variants: self-propelled Pechora-2M (S-125-2M) and containerised Pechora-2K (S-125-2K).
The S-125 Pechora ADMS upgrades are designed to protect administrative, industrial and military installations against air strikes by aircraft, helicopters and cruise missiles (including stealth ones) in simple and complex jamming conditions.
The upgraded systems feature improved performance:
On customer request, the ADM system delivery set can be changed to include foreign-made equipment, chassis, materials, software, components, etc.
Pechora 2M operator stations using COTS LCD displays.
The Pechora 2M upgrade includes a fully mobile Low Blow offered on alternative MZKT-8022 truck chassis.
Above: The Pechora 2M TEL is based on a 6 x 6 MZKT-8022 chassis and uses the two round 5P71 launcher. Below: The Low Blow is also carried by the same vehicle (© 2011 Michael Jerdev).
Annex A Defence Systems S-125-2M Pechora 2M [IMINT]
Almaz-Antey are offering the Pechora 2A technology insertion upgrade for the legacy S-125 / SA-3 Goa design, using digital components previously used in the S-300PMU1/2 / SA-20 Gargoyle. There is 90% commonality with the S-75-2 / SA-2 upgrade package.
Rosoboronexport Description (Cite):
The upgrading of the S-125 Pechora system envisages:
At customer request, delivery set of the S-125-2A Pechora-2A ADMS can be supplemented with foreign-made equipment and facilities.
Polish designed Cenrex Newa SC S-125M upgrade package CTM-2/T-55 TEL in the foreground, and SNR-125 Low Blow in the background (Tetraedr image).
The Polish Army pursued an extensive upgrade, part of which involved converting the S-125 system to a fully self-propelled design, under the Newa-C and -SC effort. Initially, it was intended that the SNR-125 Low Blow and 5P73 be carried on a CTM-2 (T-55) tank chassis, but the vibration and size of the vehicle proved incompatible with the radar.
The second iteration was to rebuild surplus 9P117 Scud TELs, to carry both the SNR-125 radar and 5P73 launcher. The latter proved technically successful but the supply of local Scud TELs was not sufficient to support the Polish Army program, and a compromise using the tank chassis for the TEL and Scud launcher chassis for the radar was adopted. Polish sources claim the marketing of this upgrade to India was blocked by the Russian government.
The upgrade involves replacement of all legacy electronic hardware with digital COTS hardware and software.
The Polish Newa-SC WNO-125SC upgrade sees the hitherto towed SNR-125 Low Blow carried by a MAZ-543 8 x 8 "Kashalot", salvaged from retired 9P117 Scud TELs. Upper image with C2 cabin removed. Additional images ,  (Cenrex images, Tetraedr image below).
Cenrex Description (Cite):
Uplink transmit/receive labelled as "Rocket", radar transceivers labelled as "Target".
Test launch of the Newa SC, note the installed cabin on the WNO-125SC Low Blow.
Newa-SC missileer console using LCD panels and COTS hardware (Cenrex).
Polish MAZ-543 TEL demonstrator rebuild from a 9P117 Scud TEL. The wheeled 5P73 TEL configuration remains on offer. Additional image .
Cuban SA-3 TELs on display (via Vestnik-PVO).
Cuba has developed and deployed an indigenous TEL based on the four rail 5P73 launcher and obsolete T-55 tank chassis. The total number of conversions is unknown, but multiple TELs were publicly displayed during the 2006 Havana parade. This design is sufficiently different from the Polish Ankol/Cenrex design to be safely considered unique.
This image shows the large aft mounted cable spool and empty outboard launch rails well. No images have surfaced to date showing all four rails loaded.
SA-3 TELs in foreground, SA-2 TELs in background (via Vestnik-PVO).
SA-2 TEL, SA-3 TEL and SA-13 Gopher on display.
5N62 Square Pair 'Illumination and Guidance Radar'. This FMCW long range target illuminator uses separate paraboloid sections each for the transmit and receive paths, with the central body used to prevent spillover. The radiating elements from the antenna feeds are mounted on the central body.
The legacy S-200 family of 160 nautical mile range class long range SAMs has been largely replaced in Russian service by more recent variants of the S-300PMU family of systems. Nevertheless the system is of some interest as it was exported to a number of Soviet client states, including Belarus, Uzbekistan, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, India, North Korea, Libya, Syria, and more recently Iran. Much of this proliferation occurred after the 1998 fire sale of former PVO-S warstock and inventory, as the S-200 was phased out of Russian service.
Upgrades are on offer, include a facility to hybridize the SA-5 with the SA-20 Gargoyle.
The semi mobile 5P72 series launchers used with the SA-5 are often installed in permanent revetments. This image shows a 5P72 and a late model transporter/transloader.
The S-300PMU2 30N6E2 Tomb Stone engagement radar (Said Aminov, Vestnik PVO).
Interfaces and software are available for the S-300PMU2 Favorit / SA-20 Gargoyle and S-400 Triumf / SA-21 to control the S-200 Angara/Vega/Dubna / SA-5 Gammon and its 5N62 Square Pair engagement radar. In this arrangement, an SA-20/21 system with its high power aperture and highly jam resistant acquisition and engagement radars prosecutes an engagement, but rather than launching its organic 48N6 series missile rounds, it uses the SA-5 Gammon round instead.
The 5N62 Square Pair is effectively slaved to the 30N6E2 or 92N6E phased array engagement radar and acts as a specialised Continuous Wave illuminator, rather than long range target tracking and illuminating element of the battery. This model is analogous to the S-300V/SA-12 scheme, where the 9A82/83 TELARs with their CW illuminators are slaved to the 9S32 Grill Pan phased array engagement radar. The notion that any part of the cumbersome, slow and electronically vulnerable acquisition and tracking function of the Square Pair would be retained in the hybrid system makes no sense, and indeed it would nullify many of the benefits of using the hybrid in the first place.
This has important implications for future combat against users of this hybrid system. In the legacy SA-5 system, a search radar such as a Tall King or Bar Lock would cue the Square Pair engagement radar, which would search the area of interest with a narrow pencil beam in an automated spiral or raster pattern, or manually, until the target was acquired and tracked, upon which the SA-5 missiles with CW homing seekers were tuned to the CW carrier (in early variants) and then launched. As the 1980s skirmishes between the US Navy and Libyan air defences illustrated, US EA-6B Prowlers with their ALQ-99 jamming equipment were able to successfully disrupt tracking by the Square Pair and render the SA-5 missiles unusable.
In a hybrid SA-5/SA-20/SA-21 system, attempts to jam the Square Pair will be ineffective as it is functioning as a simple open loop CW illuminator and missile command uplink transmitter. Because the SA-5 is a static system, operators can precisely calibrate the Square Pair in azimuth and elevation, and given the availability of Glonass, GPS and satellite imagery, this calibration is neither expensive in time or resources. Once this has been performed it presents no difficulties for a Glonass/GPS equipped autonomous SA-20/21 battery to issue over a radio datalink launch and cueing commands to the SA-5 battery, and once the missiles have been launched, precision elevation and azimuth commands to the Square Pair to control illumination and missile uplink functions. Indeed, once such integration has been performed, it is an open question whether it would be even economical let alone operationally viable to retain the full SA-5 battery package of K-1, K-2, K-3 and K-9 trailers, as a rack of digital equipment installed in the Square Pair K-1/1M radar head trailer to provide interface and control functions would be cheaper to run and more effective in combat.
The challenge which a hybrid SA-5/SA-20/SA-21 system presents is considerable. The SA-20/21 battery is highly mobile, and with modern digital frequency hopping radars, will be difficult to jam. Soft kill and hard kill become problematic. In terms of defeating the SA-5 component of the hybrid, the only option is to jam the missile CW homing seeker, the effectiveness of which will depend entirely on the vintage of the 5G24N series seeker and the capabilities of the jamming equipment. If the customer opts for an upgrade to the seeker electronics, the seeker may be digital and very difficult to jam.
The hybrid SA-5/SA-20 option is available to nations using both of the SAM systems - a known instance being Iran.
Tetraedr are offering a technology insertion upgrade for the S-200VE, in addition to the overhaul and zero timing of the 5V28VE missile round. It is not known whether this upgrade product has been exported to date.
The digital technology insertion upgrade is intended to increase the capabilities and reliability of the system. Specific improvements claimed are in countermeasures resistance and kinematic range, indicating the upgrade includes the 5G22/5G23/5G24 CW semi-active homing radar seeker.
Almaz-Antey are offering a similar upgrade package but have not disclosed any specific details to date.
характеристики ЗРК "Квадрат" с СОУ ЗРК
Principal tactical / technical characteristics of the Kvadrat SAM system with the Buk-M1-2 TELAR
With 3М9М3 (3М9М) SAM
9А310-М1-2 и ЗУР
With 9А310-М1-2 TELAR and 9М317 SAM
Engagement envelope for aerodynamic targets:
|- по дальности (км)
- in range [km]
|4 -25||3 -42|
|- по высоте (км)
- in altitude [km]
|0,03 -14||0,015 -25|
Maximum velocity of defeated targets:
- closing [m/s]
- receding [m/s]
Single Shot Pk
цели и вертолёты
- aerodynamic targets and helicopters
- helicopters in hover
перегрузки поражаемых целей
Maximum load factor of defeated targets [G]
Number of concurrent engagements
|1||2 (1 цель- СОУ, 1
1 by Straight Flush, 1 by TELAR
SAM launch mass [kg]
|Вес боевой части
SAM warhead mass [kg]
развёртывания с марша (мин)
Setup time [min]
SAM guidance method
«Оса-АК» и «Оса-АКМ»
Comparative Characteristics of the Osa, Osa-AK and Osa AKM
||Год принятия на вооружение||1972||1975||1980|
||Зона поражения по дальности, км||2-9||1,5-10||1,5-10|
||Зона поражения по высоте, км||0,05-5||0,025-5||0,025-5|
|Курсовой параметр, км||4-6||до 6||до 6|
||Вероятность поражения одной ЗУР||
||КР||до 0,4||до 0,4||до 0,6|
||ДПЛА||до 0,7||до 0,8||до 0,8|
||Максимальная скорость цели, м/с||до 420||до 500||до 500|
||Время реакции, с||26-34||26-34||26-34|
||Масса БМ, кг||около 1900||около 1900||18680|
||Масса ЗУР/БЧ, кг||128/15||128/15||128/15|
||Время перевода в боевое/походное положение, мин||3-5/3-5||3-5/3-5||3-5/3-5|
||Максимальная скорость движения, км/ч||до 80||до 80||до 80|
Comparative Characteristics of ADMS (Tetraedr data)
|Characteristics||"ОSA-АКМ" ADMS||"OSA-1T" ADMS|
|1. Time out of action (deployment), min||4||4|
|2. Number of target channels||1||1(2)|
|3. Number of missile channels||2||2|
|4. Maximum speed of approaching / receding targets, m/sec||500 / 300||700 / 350|
|5. Minimal altitude of target engaged, km||0.025||0.025|
|6. Maximum altitude of target engaged, km||5||7|
| 7. Range to remote boundary of
(tactical fighter / helicopter), km:
|10.3 / 6.5||12 / 10|
|8. Maximum course parameter of the target engaged, km||6||8|
|9. Guidance methods||Тhree points, Н, Fi, High trajectory||KDC, MТP|
| 10. Kill probability with one missile:
a) tactical fighter
c) maneuvering target
0.5 - 0.7
0.4 - 0.7
0.2 - 0.5
0.6 - 0.8
0.6 - 0.8
0.4 - 0.7
обнаружения воздушных целей Л-136
L-136 MAK-F IRST
(цель типа F-15), км
Detection range versus F-15 type target [km]
Elevation coverage [deg]
Azimuthal coverage [deg]
Search duration [sec]
Tracking error [min]
Power consumption [kW]
Max road speed [km/h]
Max speed in water [km/h]
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