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Updated: Mon Sep 1 03:46:06 UTC 2008
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Is
the Gordon England Letter
on F-22 Export to Australia
Fair Dinkum?
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Air Power
Australia - Australia's Independent Defence Think Tank
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Air Power Australia Media Release
14th
February, 2007
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Contacts:
Peter Goon Mob: 0419-806-476 / Dr Carlo Kopp Mob: 0437-478-224
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In the light of rising public criticism of the proposed acquisition of
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, from a wide range of sources, the
Defence
Minister has disclosed to selected journalists the existence of a
letter
from US Deputy Secretary of Defence Gordon England, purporting that the
US will not sell the F-22 Raptor to Australia, said a spokesman for Air
Power Australia today.
"It is now incumbent on the Defence Minister to table this
document. The quoted source, Mr Gordon England, is merely a Deputy
Secretary in the US Department of Defence. Decisions of this magnitude
involving the export of leading edge military technology are decided by
the Congress, not the civil service, and ultimately by the Office of
the
President himself."
"If Australia wished to buy the F-22, this matter can only be
negotiated at the highest level, directly between the Prime Minister
and
the US President."
"The letter, in fact, appears to say little more than there is no
current plan to export the F-22, which given the prior history of this
issue in the US could change at any time."
"Australia, Britain and Canada remain the most trusted allies of the
United States, and there is no known precedent for the US flatly
denying, by arbitrary ruling, the export of a major weapon system to
any
of these allies. In every known instance, the system was exported, but
sometimes alterations were made to protect sensitive items."
"Does the Minister seriously believe that all top end US military
systems will never be made available to the most trusted US allies,
such
as Britain, Australia, Canada, and as is currently under consideration,
Japan? Historically this has always happened."
"The statement by the Deputy Secretary appears to have been made
without the formal process of export evaluation for Australia, which is
a requirement for all sensitive Low Observable (stealth) technologies."
Background
"The US initiated an effort during the late 1990s to establish a formal
internal government agency protocol to assess whether aircraft using
these technologies can be exported to specific allies, and if so, with
what specific design alterations to protect sensitive technology."
"The 'LOEXCOM' protocol, as it is known and is detailed in a public
study authored by then LtCol Matthew Molloy, US Air Force, published in
June 2000, was detailed as a four step process [1].
"The Molloy paper articulated the policy
in detail, and concluded that only three US allies were considered at
that time trustworthy enough to be sold the F-22. These allies were
Australia, Britain and Canada."
"The much publicised 'Obey Amendment' to the defence appropriations
bill does not detail policy, but prohibits the spending of US
taxpayer's
funds on marketing the technology in the F-22 overseas. The LOEXCOM
protocol was developed in response to a request by Wisconsin
Congressman, David Obey, who wanted a formal policy in place for
determining what could be exported to whom."
"In the last days of the Clinton administration, President Clinton
publicly stated that the F-22 would be exported to Israel. Since then
Japan has been actively lobbying in Washington for the export of the
F-22 to Japan as a replacement for Japan's F-15CJ fleet."
"Last year the issue of F-22 export to Japan resulted in some very
intensive debate in US defence circles, and a Congressional committee
subsequently decided to remove the 'Obey Amendment' from the
appropriations bill. In further Congressional debate, another committee
reinstated the amendment, by a narrow margin in the vote."
"A number of US analysts are of
the view that the US should export the F-22 to Australia and Japan to
ensure stability in the Pacific Rim region, which has seen the largest
buys of modern aircraft and missile technology since the last decade of
the Cold War in Europe."
"There is a strong strategic case - in the US national interest - that
Australia and Japan should acquire F-22 variants."
"It is known that during the 1999-2001 period the US Defense Department
did go through the first step in the four step LOEXCOM protocol, and
performed an Integrated Product Team
assessment of the F-22's exportability to Australia. It is also known
that this assessment, initiated at the request of the then RAAF
leadership, concurred with Molloy's assessment that Australia was a
safe
export target for the F-22A."
The Integrated Product Team study
defined two configurations of the aircraft, configuration 'A' with
almost full capability, and configuration 'B' with a number of
sensitive
stealth and software features removed. Australia would have been
offered the 'A' configuration, with some features turned off but
available to Australia in time of conflict."
"The Gordon England letter, if it has been cited correctly, raises a
number of challenging questions which should of very serious concern to
Australia's foreign policy and defence community:
- The first question is whether Australia's standing in the
eyes of the Bush Administration has been diminished, to the extent that
the favourable conclusions of the Molloy paper and 1999-2001 Integrated Product Team analysis of
the exportability of the F-22 to Australia no longer apply?
- The second question is whether the established four step
LOEXCOM protocol still remains in existence, and if it has been
abandoned, what actual protocol will be applied in the future on the
export of stealth technology in aircraft such as the F-22 and Joint
Strike Fighter. If the F-22 will not be available in even a 'reduced
stealth' configuration to Australia, will the Joint Strike Fighter be
available in a 'full stealth' configuration?
- The third question is whether this effective policy change
will remain applicable in the future. Historically, all restrictions on
the export of sensitive military technologies have eventually been
waived, particularly in the case of the closest allies of the US.
The Gordon England letter sets an important precedent, as this is the
first time Australia has ever been flatly denied access to a major US
weapon system, rather than offered the system even with some detail
features altered to protect US technology.
In practical terms, the Gordon England letter, as cited, qualifies the
unavailability of the F-22 to Australia as 'our current position',
which
means that a future policy change is not ruled out."
"This means that policy changes at a Congressional or Administration
level over the next two years could result in changes to the cited US
position."
"What has not changed is Australia's strategic need for the capability
in the F-22, which cannot be provided by the Joint Strike Fighter or
the
F/A-18F Super Hornet."
"What has also not changed is that the premature retirement of the
F-111 results in around a 50 percent reduction in Australia's strike
capability."
"The non-viability of the current Defence plan, which will cost $22
billion or more, should the Super Hornet be acquired, remains also
unchanged."
"The need for fundamental policy change in Australia's planning for the
future of the RAAF remains a key imperative. Australia must actively
seek policy change in the US to gain access to the F-22, longer term."
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[1] "The
'LOEXCOM' protocol, detailed in a public study authored by then LtCol
Matthew Molloy of the School of Advanced Air power Studies at the Air
University at Maxwell AFB, published in June 2000, was detailed as a
four step process [1]:
- An Integrated
Product Team comprising Air Force, defense department and
defense
contractors examines export issues for a specific ally.
- Integrated Product
Team findings are then submitted to a Defense Department Tri-Service Committee for review.
- The Integrated
Product Team and Tri-Service
Committee findings are submitted to the Low Observable Executive Committee
(LOEXCOM) for review.
- These findings are then submitted to the State
Department for an Exception to
National Disclosure Policy Committee review.
After the State Department has approved the export, the
Foreign Military Sales [FMS] sales protocol would apply, which is that
Congress must approve the sale."
Cited: "Air-exports with advanced or stealth technologies,
such as are found on the F-22, require a specialized,
component-by-component review as specified by export regulation. This
process starts at the service level (in the F-22's case it would be the
USAF) who will initiate an export feasibility evaluation through a
four-step process. First, an "Integrated Product Team," consisting of
members from the Air Force, DOD, and defense contractors, will be
created to examine potential export issues specific to the aircraft
under consideration. Next, the Product Team will notify the Tri-Service
Committee on their findings. This committee reviews the weapon system
and its technologies comparing them to the Critical Military
Technologies List, the Low Observabilities (LO) List, and the
Counter-LO
List and then makes a decision whether the aircraft needs to be
reviewed
by the Low Observable Executive Committee (LOEXCOM), the third step in
the process. For aircraft as advanced as the F-22 and JSF, LOEXCOM
review is required."
"Once the weapon system has been approved by LOEXCOM for
export, the review process moves to the State Department which forms an
Exception to National Disclosure Policy Committee. This committee is
comprised of the CIA, the NSA and other senior
government
representatives."
"After the State Department approves the export,
state-to-state negotiations between the U.S. and the importing country
may begin. Since the F-22 sale will be under the auspices of FMS,
negotiations remain at the government level (including USAF inputs)."
U.S.
MILITARY AIRCRAFT FOR SALE: CRAFTING AN F-22 EXPORT POLICY, Matthew H.
Molloy, Lt Col, USAF
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Air
Power Australia Website - http://www.ausairpower.net/
Air Power Australia Research and
Analysis - http://www.ausairpower.net/research.html
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Artwork, graphic design and text © 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 Carlo Kopp; Text © 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 Peter Goon; All
rights reserved. |
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