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Updated: Sat Feb 27 17:56:17 UTC 2010
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APA NOTAMS ISSN 1836-7135
The
Changing Tide in Australia's Air Power
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Air Power
Australia - Australia's Independent Defence Think Tank
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Air Power Australia NOTAM
6th January,
2008
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| Contacts: |
Peter
Goon
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Carlo
Kopp
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Mob:
0419-806-476 |
Mob:
0437-478-224
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The 2007/2008 New Year
period saw a flurry of activity in what has been a lengthy period of
‘trench warfare’ over Australia’s New Air Combat Capability (NACC)
planning, the main targets of dissent being Defence’s decisions in
relation to the early retirement of the F-111, the uncritical pursuit
of
the JSF, and the impromptu purchase of the Super Hornet. The flurry
started with media reports of the new Labor Government’s sensible plan
to conduct a thorough review of NACC options, but these soon gave rise
to such headlines as ‘Jet Contract May be Torn Up’ and ‘Scrapping
Hornets Could Harm US Ties.’
All major newspapers seem to have jumped
into the fray, firing off whatever ‘information’ they had.
Unfortunately, the result has been to miss important factors and to
repeat as fact statements that have already been proven to be wrong.
The
aim of this NOTAM is to direct attention and discussion back to
fundamentals.
The Strategic Requirement
Time and again, governments have restated
the central role of air power, as follows:
‘Air combat is the most important
single
capability for the defence of Australia, because control of the air
over
our territory and maritime approaches is critical to all other types of
operation in the defence of our Nation.’
While enshrined in the RAAF’s Air Power
Manual, this very simple concept seems to come second to joint
operations and coalition operations when it comes to force structure
planning. These types of operations, of course, rely upon some other
country to provide the ‘friendly air’ under which we will operate, so
there is a tendency for Defence to lose sight of the central role of
air
power.
However, the role of air power as stated by
successive governments has two complementary dimensions which must
always be kept in mind:
- Firstly, our capability must be able
to guarantee the ‘friendly air’ we need to conduct land and sea
operations in our region, safely and effectively.
- Secondly, our capability must
contribute, in concert with our regional allies, to the maintenance of
security in our region. In this regard, Australia must aim to play a
leading and demonstrably competent role rather than a second-tier,
supportive role that has to rely upon someone else providing the
‘friendly air’ critical to all successful operations.
Some papers reported a possible option here,
based upon whether Australia will need the capability to face ‘state-of
the-art’ opposition, or will only be involved in coalition support
operations and so can leave the ‘state- of- the- art’ (’friendly air’)
role to others.
Unfortunately, much Defence thinking seems
to be driven by a ‘coalition’ and ‘joint operations’ focus, much as has
happened in the USA, which will result in a distorted longer-term force
structure that will dictate against our ability to conduct any
independent operations unaided. In effect, this path will lead
inevitably to:
- An inability to control (unaided)
the
air over our territory and our air and maritime approaches, as required
by government.
- An inability to provide (unaided)
‘friendly air’ for any land or sea operations in our region.
- An inability to contribute as a
leading partner in support of regional security arrangements
This will inevitably produce a clear
perception amongst our neighbours and our allies, particularly the USA,
that we are no longer willing to pull our weight in regional defence
matters. Australia must decide unequivocally whether it wishes to play
a
leading role as an independent nation capable of contributing
meaningfully to regional security [1].
Coalition support can be made to fit into this framework without
conflict, but it is essential that our NACC decisions are not driven by
any ‘either/or’ role pressures. In the final analysis, Australia is
faced with a need for two aircraft types to do the work it wants to do
at the standard that it must be done.
F/A-18E Super
Hornet Block I (US DoD).
The Super Hornet
Claims in support of the Super Hornet
decision continue to be made without operational or technical basis,
and
seemingly without embarrassment. Boeing continues with its mantra of “The
platform Australia is buying has world class stealth capabilities, low
visibility, great range and great survivability” [2].
Sadly, these easily-challenged and fanciful
statements have been taken up within Defence leadership and by the RAAF
without question or qualification. One senior RAAF operator went on to
say: “The Super Hornet’s fifth generation stealth characteristics
minimised the chance of detection.” In the face of such
statements,
it might well be assumed that the aircraft was accepted for procurement
without anyone in Australia having access to, or having read, the
aircraft’s NATOPS (Flight) Manual. A simple read of that document would
have sobered anyone involved with the aircraft or been exposed to the
Manufacturer’s PowerPoint presentations.
However, the aircraft’s actual capabilities
against those claimed will be the subject of a separate APA Analysis
now
in preparation, a task that should have been done as a matter of course
by the RAAF and Defence before the aircraft was even considered (if it
was), let alone purchased.
The previous Minister for Defence reportedly
stands by his decision to purchase the Super Hornet 100 percent, adding
that the acquisition was recommended by the Australian Defence Force,
including the RAAF. However, the truth behind this statement has yet to
be tested fully – the evidence available to support this statement is
certainly not compelling.
Most importantly, the overtly extravagant
and misleading assessments of the Super Hornet’s capabilities have to
be
confronted and exposed with the data and the facts available before any
NACC analysis can proceed. Similarly, verifiable and accurate
capability
baselines will also need to be established for the F-111 and the JSF,
as well as any other contenders, particularly the 5th
Generation F-22A and its planned derivatives, as this is the area where
Australia should be focussed strongly in establishing a force structure
to meet the challenges that will develop over the next 30 years or more.
In looking at the Super Hornet dilemma, it
should be remembered that Boeing’s intentions under its Project
Archangel is to market more Super Hornets (both F/A-18E/F and
electronic
attack G Models) into Australia so that they become our primary air
power capability. This possibility becomes a probability given the
previous Defence Minister’s declaration that “We are Hornet Country”,
coupled with the increasing likelihood that the JSF Project may not
proceed, or proceed to an unacceptable time/cost schedule and
capability
erosion.
Should Boeing’s plans eventuate, Australia
will be left with an evolved 3rd Generation fleet of
aircraft
for the next 30-plus years. No matter what ‘tarting up’ is done to the
Super Hornet, it will always remain an evolved 3rd
Generation
aircraft, optimised for carrier based operations, with entrenched
design/performance limitations that cannot be overcome or compensated
for to meet our primary role and strategic need for air superiority.
Anyone who claims otherwise will also have to dismiss the assertions of commonality with the 3rd
Generation 1980s Hornet classic so stridently argued by Dr Nelson, Boeing and those in the RAAF leadership
who “don't know what they don't know”.
If Australia is to take up its envisaged
role in our region (in particular) and the world (in general), it
cannot
stay with an evolved 3rd Generation capability. Resources
should be channelled into 5th Generation air power
capabilities, noting that the JSF, by design and thanks to CAIV (Cost
as
an Independent Variable), will never be a genuine 5th
Generation capability, no matter how many times the marketeers claim it
to be so. Advanced stealth characteristics were excluded as an initial
design driver on the grounds of cost, as were supersonic cruise and
high
agility with vectoring thrust. In the end, the design embodied no
growth
margins in terms of weight, volume, and electrical and cooling power.
It is thus very misleading to call it a 5th Generation
stealth aircraft. The aircraft may eventually demonstrate acceptable
ground attack capabilities, but it has many hurdles to clear before
that
can be demonstrated with any confidence.
Finally, any suggestion that the Super
Hornet may be the right plane for the wrong reasons should be treated
with caution, if not totally disregarded, as this repeats the fallacy
of
accepting a capability before the operational requirement has been
established properly, and it would be the first step in locking
Australia into a long-term evolved 3rd Generation air combat
capability.
Scrapping Super Hornets Could Harm
US Ties
An article in the Australian on 1st
January raised the possibility that scrapping the Super Hornet could
harm our ties with the USA, both commercially and diplomatically, which
seems to be a strange suggestion. Firstly, the US is not averse to
taking tough decisions on defence matters when considered necessary,
and
so could not take exception to others exercising the same prerogative.
In regard to the Super Hornet, it should be remembered that the US
Government has some unfinished business with Boeing in regard to that
Company’s activities during the aircraft’s development phase and the
manner in which it was marketed to the US Navy. In Australia’s case,
many of the maker’s claims can only be assessed as dubious at best.
Unspecified warnings were also expressed
that any decision to axe the Super Hornet contract would carry
precipitous consequences that would require careful management in
Washington, and would result in fraught commercial ties with Boeing,
one
of Australia’s biggest defence contractors.
Australia must expect and ensure nothing
less than expert and competent commercial negotiation with Boeing, and,
as a matter of courtesy, some frank and open discussions with the US
Department of Defense explaining the reasons behind Australia’s actions
and intentions. In the end, Australia’s NACC planning should
demonstrate
clearly to all our desire to pull our weight in ensuring security in
our region, something seemingly lost in our current force structure
planning, but something that should be most welcome to the US at both
diplomatic and defence levels. The US Air Force, in particular, might
be expected to have reason for relief that we have our act together at
last as it is that Service which would have to provide us with air
support, both regionally and in any significant coalition operations,
not the US Navy.
Finally, it is probably timely for Australia
to prove that it can once again be a highly-informed customer,
operationally, technically and contractually, to all its potential
support contractors. The inevitable conflict of interest faced by
Boeing
(Australia) with regard to its commitment to support the F-111 fleet
while the parent company was marketing its replacement by the Super
Hornet should have been managed much better by both sides. The whole
business will cost Australia dearly as, under current planning, we face
the loss of a very significant part of our Defence Industry skills and
facility base. A clearing of the air with Boeing might not be a bad
thing. There is still much that Boeing can contribute to Australia’s
Defence Industry base, but it must be on Australia’s terms.
First
flight of SDD JSF Prototype AA-1 in December, 2006 (Imagery via Air
Force Link).
The Review of Air Combat Capability
Decisions
One newspaper article titled “Jet
Contract May be Torn Up’ stated that:
“Defence Department planners are believed to
have been asked to present a detailed analysis on all fighter jet
options to the new Federal Government and how they stack up against
likely adversaries.”
If this is correct, the question that arises
is – Is this a reasonable expectation? A very significant
measure
of independence from the Defence bureaucracy amongst those conducting
the review would seem to be a wise, if not mandatory requirement.
Otherwise, those doing the review would be those who, step-by-step,
created the very problem in the first place and then persisted with it
doggedly in the face of detailed analyses forewarning them of every
major problem with which they are now confronted – and others yet to be
confronted.
It is most doubtful that the new Minister
would miss the need for the review to be done by, and under the
guidance
and control of, persons having the technical and analytical skills that
the review will demand. Unfortunately, these are not now available
within Defence.
The review must also include searching inquiries into how the
Department got Australia into the current predicament, particularly
into
the methodology (or lack of it) currently used by Defence and the
Defence Material Organisation in analysing force structure
requirements,
and the equipment evaluation, selection and procurement processes. If
these questions are not answered, and changes are not introduced to
prevent recurrences, then the same trend will persist to frustrate any
new decisions. Prima facie,
there is a structural problem in Defence, resulting in inadequate
political control and direction of Defence management, aggravated by
inadequate technological and management competence within the Defence
organisation.
The work facing
the new Labor Government in its review of Defence plans and
decisions, particularly that relating to Australia’s New
Air Combat Capability, will be many faceted, requiring in
turn the marshalling of all the experience and skills
available within our Nation. It is a task well worth the
support of all who have skills to offer. The determination and
management of the selection, development and control of
sovereign assets should, rightly, be done by competent
Australians for Australians if we are to ensure the Nation’s
defence and security will be assured.
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F-22A Raptor performs first drop of the
new GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb (Photo by Darin Russell, Text by 95th Air
Base Wing Public Affairs, US Air Force).
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Footnotes:
Ted Bushell, AM is a retired Air
Commodore with 35 years experience in RAAF engineering, maintenance and
new project management. He joined the RAAF as an
Engineering
Apprentice in 1948 and left the Service in 1983 following a career as
an aeronautical engineer in Unit, Command, and Air Force Office
appointments. His final appointment was as the last Senior Maintenance
Staff Officer at Headquarters Support Command, Melbourne.
[1] The
Rudd Government's stated intentions in terms of policy, declared before
the election, are for Australia to be self reliant in basic
capabilities
and to be able to play an important role in the region. In this respect
the Minister has inherited a force structure plan with design
objectives diametrically opposed to
government policy. Refer Kopp C., Sorting
out Defence mess the key to Rudd's plan, Canberra Times, 16th December,
2007.
[2] Bob Gower, Chief Hornet Salesman,
Boeing. Refer McPhedran I, Super
Hornet stings Brendan Nelson, Herald
Sun, 1st January, 2008.
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Air
Power Australia Website - http://www.ausairpower.net/
Air Power Australia Research and
Analysis - http://www.ausairpower.net/research.html
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