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A feature common to most Tier 1 air
combat/fighter aircraft is the ability to takeoff with full internal
fuel and
full payload. Most have a margin in excess of this ‘total load’
figure which allows for growth in weight over the aircraft's service
life.
Weight is one of the easier
aspects of
aircraft design to understand, unlike others which are often made
intentionally confusing by the maker, his statements then being
unfortunately taken on face value and repeated by the potential
purchaser. Such design characteristics include the more emotional 'stealth',
'supercruise', 'network centric system
of systems', and advanced radars such as 'AESA
Radars', which makers describe in confusing technical jargon,
implying capabilities to their aircraft which they do not have in the
true sense.
What is called the
aircraft's Empty Weight is
one of the most basic and important aspects of
aircraft design. This is the weight akin to what is seen at a
‘Biggest
Loser’ type weigh in; the ‘down
to your skivvies’ weight, which
for aircraft is without fuel or other payload such as bombs or
missiles, sensor pods, external fuel tanks, or crew. The Empty Weight is fundamental to how
well the
aircraft will aerodynamically perform, how much fuel and payload it
will be
able to carry, and how much growth it can accommodate throughout its
life.
Weight, however, is such a
predominant
design objective/factor that it may alone determine whether or not an
aircraft will proceed to the production stage. In these cases, the
designer just cannot meet the operational requirements within the
maximum weight constraint. Where the designer strikes serious weight
problems, it behoves the potential purchaser to exercise more than
usual caveat emptor, that is exercise
greater due diligence when
monitoring the program.
Not surprisingly, the JSF
Program has had weight issues. In 2003, the STOVL JSF was
declared
overweight and the SWAT (STOVL Weight Attack Team) was formed to
perform a Biggest Loser
miracle.
At the end of 2004, the SWAT declared they had
removed ‘over 2,700 lbs’ off the STOVL aircraft's weight, with
commensurate weight reductions for the other two models; the Carrier
Variant
(CV) and the one which Defence and the Government say we will buy, the
Conventional Take Off and Land (CTOL) variant. The news that the
JSF had
faced its Biggest Loser
weight challenge and won was spread far and wide by the
manufacturer's men and those of the prospective customers alike.
Now that all the hoopla, hype and weight reduction dust has settled, a
look at
the “weigh in”records of all three variants shows a somewhat
different story -
| Design
Configuration Target Weight |
#240-1
(CY-2002)
[lbs] |
#240-2
(CY-2003)
[lbs] |
#240-4
(CY-2006)
[lbs] |
%
change since 2002 |
Max
Fuel Load (Internal)
[lbs] |
MTOW
[lbs] |
Weight
Growth Factor |
Inverse
Payload Factor |
| CV
JSF |
30,049 |
30,700 |
32,072 |
6.7% |
20,120 |
Classified |
Negative |
>0.75 |
| STOVL
JSF |
29,735 |
30,500 |
32,161 |
8.2% |
13,966 |
Classified |
Negative |
>0.75 |
| CTOL
JSF |
26,500 |
27,100 |
29,036 |
9.6% |
18,448 |
Classified |
Negative |
>0.75 |
Weight
Parameter
(Comparison) |
Empty
Weight [lb]
|
Max
Fuel
Load
(Internal)
[lbs] |
MTOW
[lbs] |
Inverse
Payload Factor |
| F-22A Raptor |
31,670
|
20,649
|
83,500
|
0.627
|
These weight figures are from the JSF Program Office
annual presentations to the US Air Force
Association and are the design target weights for the three aircraft
variants.
With an overall increase of 2,536 lbs (about 10%), the CTOL JSF
is
certainly not going to win the Biggest
Loser competition. In fact, all
three aircraft designs have shown progressive and steady
increases in their design target empty weights over
the past 4 years. Columns for the other two important weight
parameters - maximum internal fuel load and maximum take off weight
(MTOW) -
are shown with MTOW, somewhat surprisingly, being declared to be
‘classified. MTOW being held so close is a sure sign of an
aircraft
development program with weight problems.
Back in 2002, when the then
senior Defence leadership convinced the Government that the JSF was the
way to
go, the MTOW was stated as 60,000 lbs. In the recently posted RAAF data sheet
on the CTOL JSF, the
MTOW is stated as in excess of 22,700 kgs (50,000 lbs). Splitting
the
difference (55,000 lbs) makes for some interesting hypotheticals, which
will become high risks for Australia if
they turn out to be true.
Even at a
MTOW of 60,000 lbs, none of the three JSF model designs present with an
aircraft
that is able to take off with full internal fuel and its full external
payload,
let alone internal and external payloads, together. The latter
would
not be possible even if the MTOW were 66,000 lbs. Similarly, all
three
variants have a negative weight growth factor, that is, there is no
margin in
the design for increases in weight over the aircraft's life, whereas
aircraft like the F-22A, F-15C/E and F-111, as well as the Russian
Su-27/30 family of
aircraft, have significant margins for
growth.
The other parameter shown in the above
table is referred
to as
the Inverse Payload Factor
which is an engineering means of comparing different aircraft on
the basis of their payload capability relative to fuel load and
combined structural/systems
weight. A factor of 0.7 or less is common for aircraft that have
distinguished themselves in service, principally due to efficient and
effective
design, with aircraft like the F-15E and F-22A scoring well at less
than
0.65. In fact with the additional considerations of significant thrust
available and a maximum zero fuel weight of 47.1 klb, the design
latitudes within the F-22 present an aircraft of awesome capabilities
and growth, both for now and into the distant future.
What does this all mean?
Well, put simply, all the
claims about
the JSF being able to carry more weapons than, say the F-22A or the
F-111 and do
so more efficiently and effectively go the way of most things that are
simply
not true –- out the window. The real concern now, given the above
data, should be whether the JSF is going to be able to lift a useful
combat payload with
its fuel tanks full or,
like other small air combat aircraft, is going to produce a heavy
reliance on tanking just to stay in the game. This should be of
particular concern for the devotees of the Carrier Variant because
the weight characteristics are trending towards those of programs
that have not made it on to the boat, for instance, the ubiquitous
A-12 (planned A-6 replacement). Those who are not CV devotees should
not ignore these trends
because a ‘no show’ of the Navy Carrier Variant puts higher cost
and schedule risks on their buys.
Those with experience in defence capability development know that the
5% that the Minister can't tell us about, because it is 'classified',
will not
in any way change design fundamentals when comparing the capabilities
of the JSF with those of the F-22 or the Evolved F-111, or equally
importantly the Su-27/30 family of aircraft. Even the 'shrouded
in secrecy' weapon system going into the JSF - now being marketed
through highly classified presentations as 'likely to revolutionize the
battle space'- will not change any design fundamentals. In simple
terms, it will still be a system like any other and so can be fitted to
other platforms, including aircraft more capable than the JSF, which
is, unfortunately, turning into an overweight design with no
weight
growth and limited air-to-air capabilities - the very advantages
we need
to ensure regional air superiority.
This brings us back to the other 10% - the growth in weight -
that the Minister and his
Departmental bureaucrats do not wish to discuss, and their overwhelming
dependence upon a 'system of systems' concept to assure Australia's air
combat edge over the next 30 years or more. The Chief of Air
Force expressed it as: 'The RAAF's air combat power is not a function
of any particular aircraft, but how all elements combine to support a
multi-level net-centric warfare concept'. This is inverted thinking,
and dangerous. Firstly, it assumes that we can get away with
second tier aircraft by maintaining an offsetting network-centric
superiority - that is, we will always be ahead of any adversary.
Secondly, it ignores the reality that systems are designed to enhance a
platform's basic capabilities, not replace them.
The 'system of systems' concept where 'the capabilities of the
whole are greater than the sum of the parts' is laudable in theory and
can be quite effective in practice, PROVIDED that it is not used to
justify building a system using parts of a lesser capability. As the
former aerospace industry chairman/CEO whose escalating costing
prediction for future fighter aircraft started this whole JSF
genre, Norm Augustine, was also heard to say, "when trying to turn a
sow's ear into a silk purse, 'tis best to start with a Silk
Sow". The strength of any chain is measured by its weakest
link
and the currently weakest link in the new air combat capability debate
is
the inability of the Minister and his Department to see that 'systems'
will come and go, but the platforms that make these systems effective
must serve us well for over 30 years. Systems do not an aircraft
make, they only enhance or reduce its ability to do the job efficiently
and effectively.
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