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Updated: Sun Jan 17 14:43:19 UTC 2010
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APA NOTAMS ISSN 1836-7135
F-35 JSF: The
Gamekeeper vs the Poachers
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JET
Mk.II
Juxtaposition
and the 'Normalisation of Deviance'
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Air Power
Australia - Australia's Independent Defence Think Tank
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Air Power Australia NOTAM
22nd
November,
2009
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Peter Goon, BEng (Mech), FTE
(USNTPS),
Head of Test and Evaluation, Air Power
Australia
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| Contacts: |
Peter
Goon
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Carlo
Kopp
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Mob:
0419-806-476 |
Mob:
0437-478-224
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(Imagery via Air Force Link).
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The deliberations currently under way on the future of
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program have far reaching implications
for the US armed services, the armed services of partner nations,
future defence budgets in all of these nations, and no less
importantly, the widely marketed intent by the Obama Administration to
reform the ailing US defence procurement system.
If the Hon Ashton
Carter and his Team make the wrong choices, the consequences will
reverberate for a very long time. To see why we need to drill into the
background to the JET I & II reviews, and earlier
budgetary plays surrounding this program.
The JET Mark
I review was constrained to only look at cost and schedule estimates
and only
for the 2010 - 2015 timeframe. In other words, not to consider
the
current year proposal activities for the President's Budget (PB), since
they
were already underway, and only consider forward estimates for the five
year
projection (FYDP).
JET Mk II was
likely similarly constrained to these metrics over this timeframe.
Both have
reported what would normally be considered SEVERE consequences in terms
of
massive cost overruns (~$17 Billion) and similarly huge delays in
schedule (2 - 3 years).
Because of
the level of concurrency in the design, development, testing and
production of
this program, it is hard to tell when the physical
aspects of
the SDD Phase cease and the production of the aircraft begin.
However,
under the DoD 5000 Acquisition System, approval of Full Rate Production
(FRP)
as opposed to Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) occurs at Milestone C
and, by
law, this is not supposed to happen till the aircraft has passed the
tests of
initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) and the results are
presented
to the Congress.
Therefore, it
would be fair to say, the currently approved cost provisions (the
Budget) do
not include the Procurement Budget that would have been the bulk of the
pre-Jet
Mk I & II and pre-GFC total program budget estimate of $350+
Billion. The pre-Jet/pre-GFC budget for the SDD Phase and the
currently planned
8 x
LRIP phases of this program, combined, is steeped in creative
presentation and interpretation.
However, a conservative estimate, favourable to the JSF Program, would
see this
budget figure (the currently approved cost provisions) at something
less than
$50 Billion.
As such, the
JET MkI & MkII cost estimates constitute a blowout in the currently
approved cost provisions in excess of 35%.
Cognisant of
modern day program management being
driven by 'normalisation of
deviance', 'dilution of risk management processes' and 'framing', the
enormity of
these
estimates may be seen in the Defence/DMO
Liability
Risk
Management
Process and the accompanying Liability
Risk
Assessment
Template wherein for risks in the categories of
cost and
schedule, the SEVERE consequence measures are defined as an exceedence
in the currently
approved cost provisions by more than 10% and a delay in scheduled in
service date
by more than 12 months and/or a delay in achieving full operational
capability
by 2 or more years.
If, as most independent critical thinkers agree, the JET MkII estimates
are not "worst case" but, in
fact, the best case, then the Hon Ashton Carter and his Team are
facing "the
largest perfect storm" in defense procurement history.
What takes
this "largest perfect storm" beyond 'perfect' and
ensures its ranking
as 'the
largest', are the technical and operational risks inherent in the JSF
program
that are yet to be acknowledged, let alone addressed.
What is of
greater concern, if that were at all possible, and what scares the wits
out of me
and
others is, based on the attitudes and behaviours observed since 2003,
the Hon Ashton
Carter
may be forced to become both the Poacher as well as the Gamekeeper of
this just
so flawed program.
If so, he will be forced to accept the already
significantly degraded performance inherent in all three variants of
the JSF
under the auspices of "avoiding the JET estimates", thus normalising
the deviance and degraded performance in the JSF designs - in other
words, making acceptable that which should be unacceptable. If
this happened it will likely enable those responsible for this disaster
to skulk away
with
their ill gotten gains, secure in
their
core beliefs that taxpayers exist mainly to
fund rent-seekers, and national interest is secondary to self vested
interest.
In so doing,
the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(AT&L) and those calling the shots will have placed the Obama
Administration's imprimatur on the very behaviours and attitudes that
POTUS
railed against and promised to eradicate in his inauguration speech on
that
crisp, cold day in Washington DC, not that long ago.
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Air
Power Australia Website - http://www.ausairpower.net/
Air Power Australia Research and
Analysis - http://www.ausairpower.net/research.html
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