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Updated: Fri May 16 04:19:50 UTC 2008
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The Critical Gap Between
Government Policy
and
Department
of Defence
Implementation Planning
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Air Power
Australia - Australia's Independent Defence Think Tank
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Air Power Australia NOTAM
30th August,
2007
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| Contacts: |
Peter
Goon
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Carlo
Kopp |
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Mob:
0419-806-476 |
Mob:
0437-478-224 |
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“Air combat is the most
important single capability for the defence of Australia, because
control of the air over our territory and maritime approaches is
critical to all other types of operation in the defence of
Australia”.
(Defence 2000 White Paper, Air
Combat, Paragraph 8.37)
"Capability guidance
for
the Air Force emphasises the need for a qualitative air combat
edge…indeed one of the highest priorities for the Government
(is) to ensure the Air Force's combat capability is second to none in
our region".
(Government defence policy as
expressed in the Defence Update, 2007.)
"In the light of these
requirements, probably the worst large-scale defence decision I have
seen in my life was to spend $6 billion on the Super Hornet…there
is no analyst who would claim it can outperform the SU-27 family of
aircraft now ubiquitous in our region,…if we had to do
anything, why not a proper study. For many years, we will have to
get our deterrent from elsewhere in our region of paramount defence
interest as we deal with our arc of instability".
(The Hon Kim Beazley
MP in his speech of July 2007 to the Sir Vernon Sturdee Symposium.)
The speech delivered by Mr Beazley
was important for two obvious reasons; firstly for who said it and
secondly for what he said.
The speaker, as a
well-regarded
former Minister for Defence, spoke from a breadth and depth of
experience that enabled him to articulate clearly and tellingly some
of the core problems afflicting Defence planning today. The points
he made were informed, well focussed, and practical, all in sharp
contrast to the ill-informed, muddled, and shallow statements that
have characterised our recent Ministers for Defence. Today, we see a
neutering of the role and office of the Minister as direct input from
'Defence experts' has been blocked, to be replaced by the
burgeoning public service structure and inappropriate influence of
overseas interests that has been allowed to build up around him,
unchecked by either government and parliament.
This situation and
its consequences were, in part, highlighted recently by the Proust
Review of Defence Management. Very significant structural
changes
must be made to Defence if Australia is to re-establish effective
working relations between the Department and the Minister for Defence
in the manner alluded to by Mr Beazley.
The Hon Member's words were
like a
rush of fresh air through the fog of stifling obfuscation and
self-justification so characteristic of today's Department of
Defence.
Turning to what he said, his
speech
dealt with several factors vital to shaping our defence capabilities:
- The Region –and the
'Arc of Instability'.
- Our need for 'Self
Reliance'.
- Government Policy.
- Military and
political skills, especially the importance of moral fibre to both.
- Force structure and
requirements analysis.
- Comments on force
structure decisions.
While each of these items
deserves
comment, this NOTAM will concentrate on his assessment of the RAAF's
air combat capability.
The
Super Hornet Decision
When the Minister announced
his
decision to commit Australia to the expenditure of more than $A6
billion
for 24 US Navy F/A-18F aircraft to bridge an air superiority gap his
office had, for years, been denying even existed, there was an
immediate outcry from defence analysts, all voicing their sense of
disbelief. This was taken up by the media in a surprisingly well
informed way. However, many parts of the media, lacking specialised
defence analysts tasked with reporting on defence matters, moved on
to chase other rabbits that had been released by their editors or the
government. The inevitable result was to take all
pressure off the Minister and
his department and so enable the introduction of the aircraft to
proceed unnoticed. Senior Defence officials suddenly closed ranks
and followed the 'party line', applauding the Minister's decision. As
the American author, Upton Beall Sinclair, observed, “It
is hard to get a man to understand something when his salary depends
on him not understanding”.
As a consequence, we still
have the
unnecessary expenditure of $A6.6 billion for an aircraft incapable
of
ever fulfilling the promises made by the aircraft's maker to the
Minister,
and the promises made by the Minister to Cabinet.
If this decision is not
redressed,
we will have a cuckoo's egg in our air combat capability nest which,
when it hatches over the next year or so, will guarantee the RAAF will
not be able to achieve the very objectives
set by government in the Defence 2000 White Paper and so recently
restated in the 2007 Defence Update.
The Minister and Government
are
placing our Air Force in the invidious position of being incapable of
providing the deterrence and force capabilities it says we need; an
unrealistic and unjust challenge to the crews whose lives, along with
our Nation's sovereignty, will be at risk while having to face
increasingly higher technology aircraft and weapon systems throughout
the 'Arc of Instability'. This smacks of the parlous situation that
was allowed to develop immediately before the Second World War.
The Super Hornet decision is
so
flawed and represents such long term and damaging consequences to
Australia that it must be reversed and reversed immediately. Not to
do so on the basis that a mistake would have to be admitted, or a
minister embarrassed, or that it would not be politically clever
during an election year is to demonstrate that very lack of moral
fibre expressed so well by the Hon Kim Beazley.
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Footnote:
Ted
Bushell, AM is a retired Air Commodore with 35 years experience in
RAAF engineering, maintenance and new project management.
He joined the RAAF as an Engineering Apprentice in 1948 and left
the Service in 1983 following a career as an aeronautical engineer in
Unit, Command, and Air Force Office appointments. His final appointment
was as the last Senior Maintenance Staff Officer at Headquarters
Support Command, Melbourne.
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Air
Power Australia Website - http://www.ausairpower.net/
Air Power Australia Research and
Analysis - http://www.ausairpower.net/research.html
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Artwork, graphic design and text © 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 Carlo Kopp; Text © 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 Peter Goon; All
rights reserved. |
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