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Last
Updated: Fri May 16 04:19:50 UTC 2008
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Upgrading
the RAAF's F-111Gs
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| Australian
Aviation, July, 1996 |
by
Carlo Kopp
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© 1996, 2005 Carlo Kopp |
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The acquisition of the RAAF's
fifteen F-111G aircraft was without doubt one of the best value for
money defence purchases of the last decade. These capable aircraft are
aerodynamically superior to the RAAF's F/RF-111C fleet, with better
climb performance, range and a more robust inlet design.
While the
purchase of these aircraft was by all means a sensible decision,
budgetary constraints set by the former government meant that no
additional expenditure was authorised to provide type specific support.
It was expected that resources required to support the aircraft would be
found elsewhere in the existing defence budget, including Air Force
programs. The initial funds for purchasing the aircraft amounted to
A$70M, and an additional A$74M was reallocated in the existing budget to
provide logistical support. Per airframe this amounts to just under
A$10M, which compares very favourably with the cca A$70M one would pay
for a new fighter bomber, excluding logistical support costs.
Reacting to
these circumstances, the RAAF quietly conducted the customary study on
the logistical supportability of the aircraft, while concurrently
evaluating the type operationally to decide how best to integrate the
aircraft into service with 82 Wing. An unusual aspect of the former
government's directive to the ADF was that the aircraft was not to be
subjected to a weapon system upgrade to improve supportability, as is
being done to the F/RF-111C under the AUP program.
The F-111G
project was initially managed by the DoD's Department of the Secretary
of Acquisition and Logistics, who retain responsibility for managing the
DFCS upgrade, G-02 software upgrade, G-WSSF and provision of ATE (see
below). In service logistical management responsibility was transferred
to the RAAF's 501 Wing in late 1995.
A number of
upgrades for the F-111G are currently in the pipeline, scheduled for
implementation, and a number of upgrades are under serious
consideration. The intention is to provide a degree of commonality with
the post AUP F/RF-111C aircraft to minimise support costs, and maximise
operational availability.
All F-111G
aircraft will be fitted with the Digital Flight Control System (DFCS)
used in the F/RF-111C AUP aircraft (see AA Aug/Sept 95). At this time,
component kits have been acquired for all fifteen aircraft. The six
aircraft currently on the flightline will be refitted first with a
target IOC for the DFCS upgrade by 1998. Remaining aircraft will be
refitted during scheduled deep maintenance work in the latter years of
the decade.
Concurrently, the RAAF is proceeding toward a domestic software support
capability for the aircraft's mission computers. The RAAF intend to
field the G.02 software (OFP) upgrade by the end of 1997, which will see
the RAAF acquiring the source code for the computers. Because of the
aircraft's SAC origins, this source code had to be purged of all
modules which related to the aircraft's former SIOP mission and weapon
types.
The
acquisition of source code will be paralleled by the provision of the
G-WSSF software support and development environment. At this time it is
unclear how much effort would be required to adapt the existing
F/RF-111C AUP software maintenance environment to support the G-model.
Because the G-model uses the AYK-18 mission computer, and has a number
of avionic differences from the AUP system (no Pave Tack, different INS,
no GPS, Doppler Nav), the software developed for the AUP cannot be used
without a large number of modifications, and qualification testing. As
well numerous hardware and software changes would be required to the
AUP WSSF. The issue of software support is complicated by the fact that
the AUP upgrade employs newer and more powerful AP-102A computers,
which although using the same 1750A architecture binary code as the
AYK-18, do differ sufficiently to make the software non-portable across
the machines.
The USAF
had originally sought a progressive computer upgrade for the F-111A/E/G
and upon the retirement of the F-111G, the F-111E/F. With the impending
retirement of the USAF F-111 fleet, this upgrade was cancelled. The
upgrade would have involved shrinking the two mission computer black
boxes down to a pair of boards, shrinking an avionic interface box and
stores management box down to a pair of boards and repackaging the whole
set in to an existing black box chassis. This upgrade had progressed to
the point of flight testing on an FB-111A airframe, using bare bones
software, but was cancelled in early 1995 due the budgetary decision to
retire the whole fleet. This decision also led the USAF to cancel a
planned upgrade of the F-111F Pave Tack with a new Texas Instruments
Focal Plane Array thermal imager, which would have significantly
improved the reliability and picture quality of the Pave Tack.
The RAAF is
therefore faced with two options in this area, should they wish to
maintain a substantially unique F-111G avionic suite. The first is to
acquire boneyard spare (obsoleted) AYK-18s to provide for hardware
support, and maintain highly specific software for the F-111G, with
dedicated programmers and development systems. The second option,
involving higher short term expenditure, but lower long term costs, is
to refit the aircraft with the better AP-102A computer, common to the
AUP aircraft. The latter alternative yields the benefit of shared
computer hardware logistics between the G and C aircraft, and the
ability to use a lot of common source code. The common components of
source code would then be compiled with options either for the C or the
G model, to accommodate avionic and aerodynamic differences between the
aircraft. The RAAF is yet to decide which strategy to follow in this
area, although it is fair to say that a refit with AP-102s is a
technically and logistically much cleaner solution. It is intended that
the G-WSSF, in whatever form it takes, be operational by 1999.
An issue
which is as yet unresolved is whether the AUP Stores Management System
(SMS), common to the F-18 and F/RF-111C, will eventually be fitted to
the F-111G. Should there be a requirement for the aircraft to support
the full range of munitions carried by the F/RF-111C, then a good case
can be made for a refit. If the aircraft are to be limited in munitions
capability and thus roles, then the existing stores control hardware
(ACU) would be operationally adequate, but difficult to maintain due
effective obsolescence. While the option of back-fitting the F-111G with
Harpoon computers extracted from the F/RF-111C during the AUP program
does exist, it may be argued that the cost in doing so is of the same
order as the fitting of the F-18/F-111C SMS, for much less benefit.
The LN-39
electromechanical INS in F-111G predates the Honeywell RLG INS in the
AUP aircraft and will become obsolete well before the latter does.
Fitting the RLG to the F-111G will require a number of software changes
and associated qualification testing. The Doppler Nav equipment is
unique to the F-111G and will require dedicated logistics, although with
a 5,000 hr MTBF it is not seen as problematic.
The
remainder of the aircraft's offensive avionic suite is common to the AUP
aircraft, and will be supported by the same logistical system. The
RAAF's strategy is to cannibalise non-flying F-111G aircraft for such
components until the AUP logistical system becomes operational later in
the decade. From that point in time, both types will share logistical
support for common components.
An issue
which has arguably not been explored as extensively as it should be is
the option of rebuilding the G-model aircraft to an almost full AUP
avionic configuration. This involves primarily the tasks of fitting the
AUP AP-102A computers, avionics fudge box (ACU), stores management
computer/decoders (SMS/SED/ASED) and rewiring the aircraft with the new
AUP wiring harnesses, replacing the existing wiring. Doing this removes
almost all of the problems associated with maintaining separate avionics
logistics and documentation, and importantly, allows the aircraft to be
supported by the existing AUP WSSF software maintenance facility with
minimal changes. Developing the WSSF was the single most expensive
component of the AUP project, and it can be argued that a patchwork
incremental upgrade of the G-model together with the costs of adapting
the custom built WSSF to support a substantially unique G-model would
incur similar costs to a full AUP rebuild. A conservative estimate AA
has acquired is that adding the F-111G to the AUP program and cycling
the aircraft through once the F/RF-111C has been done would cost
between A$5-7M per airframe. This is because nearly all of the
engineering work has already been done for the AUP. The engineering
overheads in this approach would be similar to those incurred in the
RF-111C AUP, in that the core avionic suite is identical, and a minimum
of unique hardware and software would need to be used.
The F-111G
will retain the TF30-P-107 engines, while the F/RF-111C will be refitted
with the TF30-P-109 engine in a recently approved upgrade. The 109
series engine, to be cannibalised from mothballed F-111D aircraft,
shares many components with the 107 engine, and delivers slightly higher
thrust. The option of fitting the 109 engine to all aircraft was
rejected as too expensive, because the tailpipes in the two types are
canted at slightly different angles. Fitting the 109 engines to the
F-111G would require a hybrid installation, using the afterburner and
tailpipe from the 107 and engine proper from the 109. Because this
involves expensive qualification testing it is not currently under
consideration.
The RAAF is
presented with an interesting dilemma in the F-111G aircraft, as a
result of the previous government's unwillingness to provide resources
for full long term logistical support of the aircraft. To derive the
full operational benefit from the F-111G, and to minimise the type
specific support costs, the RAAF will need to maximise the avionic
systems commonality between these aircraft and the F/RF-111C AUP. To do
this, the RAAF will need additional resources in the short term, to do
the necessary engineering work and acquire the needed avionic
components. A good case can be made for extending the F/RF-111C AUP
program to include the F-111G aircraft, as this solves virtually all of
the long term support problems associated with maintaining a
substantially unique aircraft.
The payoff
in fully integrating the F-111G into the operational strike wing is that
of almost doubling the number of the RAAF's multirole strike aircraft
(ie 17 x F-111C, 15 x F-111G and 4 x RF-111C), for very little expense
in comparison with acquiring new strike aircraft. The fifteen
additional airframes would provide a substantial surge capability in
wartime, and allow the airframe life of the existing fleet to be
stretched more effectively by spreading the fatigue load over a much
larger pool of airframes. Full integration of an F-111G using
substantially common software and avionics would have the further
benefit of minimising the amount of type specific aircrew and
maintenance personnel training.
We can hope
that the new government follows through on its pre-election commitment
to focus resources into the ADF's combat capability, and to support the
F-111 force. The F-111 Wing is the sharp end of the ADF's offensive
capability and it would serve Australia's interests well for it to
receive the focus it deserves.
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Artwork, graphic design and text © 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 Carlo Kopp; Text © 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 Peter Goon; All
rights reserved. |
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