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Part 1
The end of the Cold War, or
perhaps more accurately, World War III, has seen a rapid decline in
defence expenditure in the Western democracies, not unlike the period
immediately following World War II. As governments cut defence budgets,
force sizes shrink and fleets are reduced, and air forces do their best
to maintain their capabilities.
The partition of most of the world's industrialised nations
into a Communist Bloc and Western Alliance, and the carving up of
allegiances in the Third World into Western aligned or Soviet aligned,
created a situation where most of the World's air forces have acquired
essentially monolithic fleets of either Western or Soviet origin. This
situation was encouraged during the Cold War if for no other reason
than committing the party in question through supply of spares and
support and operational skills.
The World of the mid 1990s is however quite different
politically and we thus see several distinct trends in the management
of military aircraft inventories.
The first trend is the decline of the military industrial base
in the former principal Cold War players. The reduced demand for new
equipment has collapsed what has been a very stable market for at least
four decades, and the shock waves of dislocation are still being felt
today. In the United States this has been most visible in mergers and
acquisitions within the military aviation industrial base. Lockheed's
acquisition of General Dynamics (Convair) Fort Worth, and Grumman's
would-be merger with Martin-Marietta or Northrop are good indications
of the trend, as manufacturers consolidate to hang on to the ever
diminishing pie of new equipment acquisitions. The political benefits
of small numbers of highly skilled defence jobs are clearly seen by
Western legislators as less important than the money to be saved and
thus any growth in new airframe acquisitions is unlikely in the nearer
future. Issues such as casualties in any future conflicts do not appear
to enter this equation.
The second clearly visible trend is the availability of
considerable quantities of used but often very modern airframes, now
surplus to the major powers' needs. Excluding supersonic MiG purchases
for under $100k, the real issue is the availability of teen series and
teenski series fighters at prices substantially below those of new
airframes. From a commercial perspective, this constitutes market
saturation and in effect "ruining" of the market's established price
structures, as governments eager to unburden themselves dump airframes
on to the market.
Shrewd players have capitalised on this situation, and the
ADF's acquisition of fifteen F-111G (FB-111A) airframes was a very
good move indeed. Regrettably, the number could not be greater.
The trend toward decline in new airframe sales and the growing
market in second hand airframes has thus produced a growing market for
overhauls and upgrades, and this could be said to be the third major
trend visible in today's marketplace.
Upgrades - the Technical
Issues
Maintaining an older airframe or system in service presents
some interesting challenges. Airframe fatigue and mechanical wearout of
propulsion, hydraulic and accessory systems are steady consumers of
replacement parts, as are wearout and random failures in electronic
subsystems such as radar, communications, nav gear, cockpit displays
and electronic warfare subsystems.
The problem which is emerging is a shortage of spare parts.
While structural and other mechanical components can be cannibalised
readily from graveyard airframes or manufactured to order, due the
relative simplicity of the processes involved, this is not so with
electronic components, which have evolved remarkably since the sixties.
Whilst aircraft of same model designations but different
production blocks may share a large fraction of common mechanical
components, this tends not to be the case with electronic subsystems,
which although possibly compatible at a subassembly level, are usually
quite differently built at a component level. This has been severely
exacerbated by a trend since the 1970s toward manufacturing custom
Silicon for military equipment, rather than using military versions of
commercially used chips, as well as the trend to competitively source
such equipment from alternate vendors during longer production runs.
Sourcing a specific 1960s power transistor or 1970s custom
integrated circuit can be extremely difficult if not quite impossible.
The rate at which this technology evolves in the computer and
communications industries is such that equipment is often obsoleted and
discarded in half a decade, and thus even the manufacturing processes
for older components are no longer available.
The US DoD has opened a facility which will manufacture custom
components using current technology, to the electrical specifications
of an obsoleted part, but this is relatively expensive and can render
the support of a largely obsolete assembly quite expensive,
particularly if the numbers involved are modest. The decision to
proceed down this track is thus difficult, and turnaround times will by
the nature of the process be prolonged.
The situation with Soviet equipment is even more painful, as
the Russians had maintained manufacturing facilities for older
technology while the aircraft were in service, rather than stockpile
components. This reflected the maintenance philosophy of the Warpac,
where low reliability was accepted and major overhauls of aircraft
conducted quite frequently. The collapse of much of the former Soviet
manufacturing base has caused something close to the collapse of the
logistical infrastructure used to support the equipment. The
prohibitive cost of maintaining older manufacturing processes has led
in many instances to the effective disappearance of the plant in
question. The Indian air force, as well as Eastern European air forces
have suffered badly in terms of availability of components for types
such as the MiG-29 Fulcrum.
The alternative is system level upgrading with new avionics.
This process involves typically a depo level refit of the airframe,
gutting parts if not all of the original avionics and replacing these
with new technology, and if applicable wiring harnesses. Airframe
specific idiosyncrasies are then typically resolved in software.
As with any such process, the customer can go through various
levels of rebuild. The most comprehensive rebuilds will see the fitting
of new engines, accessory power, electrical system, wiring, avionic
subsystems, and the zero timing of the airframe by the replacement of
critical structural components and load bearing skins. Whether the
performance and capability of the aircraft are enhanced depends
primarily on budgetary constraints. Matching an existing radar or
avionic capability with new technology is typically cheaper than the
original acquisition. Enhancing capability may cost more.
The payoff will be in vastly reduced maintenance costs, as the
latest two generations of military avionics have seen reliability
increase considerably, although it is argued by some that software bugs
have compensated for diminished hardware unreliability.
The big winners in this process have been the smaller systems
integrators, who have traditionally supplied avionic subsystems and
software integration services to the prime contractors. Contractors in
the UK, France, Israel and the US have quickly moved to exploit this
market, and any defence journal today is bristling with advertisements
for services and specific upgrades.
USAF and USN Upgrades
The United States Navy is facing the prospect of block
obsolescence across much of its aircraft fleet, a situation which has
been severely exacerbated by a series of what are arguably
ill-considered program cancellations. The Navy's frontline outer air
battle fighter, the F-14A, was to have been partially replaced by
digital F-14Ds, with the remainder of the fleet to have been reengined
and partially upgraded to F-14B configuration. A heated debate had
developed over the replacement of the F-14 with the NATF, a navalised
derivative of the USAF ATF, with contractors proposing various
configurations of F-14 upgrade. The result has been the end of F-14D
production, deployment to the fleet of jammer-less (ASPJ) airframes,
and an aging fleet of TF-30 powered F-14As in fleet squadrons. It is
unclear at this time as to what further upgrades the Tomcat will be
subjected to, although a role to encompass strike as well as air
superiority suggests that laser designation and night vision equipment
may eventually be fitted.
The A-6E Intruder was to have been upgraded to A-6G
configuration, with a new radar and enhanced avionics, as a gap filler
until the stealthy A-12 Avenger II deployed in numbers to fleet
squadrons. The A-12 died a messy death at the hands of the Bush
Administration, its would be successor the AX never went beyond the
vapourware phase and at this time no successor to the aircraft seems to
have been agreed upon. As the A-6G upgrade was cancelled, only a
limited rewinging program remained to keep the aircraft in service
until the turn of the decade. Clearly by that time the aircraft will no
longer be viable tactically so it is fair to say that the USN will lose
its long range precision strike capability.
The F/A-18 appears to have the best prospects for survival on
the carrier flight deck, although it is unclear what will happen with
earlier model A/B aircraft as the F/A-18E/F phases in at the end of the
decade. Whether these will be brought up the C/D avionic and systems
standard has not been publicised.
The United States Air Force has similar pains with a large
fleet of seventies built fighter aircraft. The F-15A/B models have
reportedly suffered availability problems due to the increasingly
difficult to support APG-63 air intercept radar, state of the art
seventies technology built with a large fraction of custom components.
It is unclear as to whether any of the fleet will be upgraded.
The C/D model fleet was upgraded to MSIP (Multi-Stage
Improvement Program) standard in the first half of the eighties, this
involving an APG-70 radar, upgraded mission computer and various
avionic subsystem upgrades. The C/D model Wings will have their role
expanded to encompass SEAD, the traditional Wild Weasel role, and many
will be fitted with an emitter locating system and wired for HARM
missiles. There is much debate in the EW community as to the wisdom of
imposing a high workload two man mission upon a single pilot, but the
US DoD seems to be determined to have its way.
The F-16 Falcon fleet is similarly aging, with many of the
older A/B airframes assigned to Air National Guard squadrons or sold to
Third World nations (eg Indonesia). The USAF had originally planned a
comprehensive avionic upgrade to the A/B airframes to equip them as
replacements for the A-10 Warthog in the CAIRS role, this including a
helmet steered thermal imaging turret projecting on to the pilot's
visor, and comprehensively upgraded communications gear. This did not
eventuate.
279 Block 15 airframes were refitted in the late eighties to
ADF (Air Defence Fighter) standard with provisions to carry Amraam,
including the Amraam datalink, an improved APG-66 radar, GPS navigation
and improved communications including the ARC-200 HF/SSB radio.
Many older aircraft were retrofitted to F-16A-OCU (Operational
Capability Upgrade) standard in the late eighties, the upgrade
involving primarily RLG INS, software upgrades and support for BVR
missiles. Mid 1991 also saw the beginning of the Mid Life Upgrade (MLU)
program for 553 airframes (originally 130 USAF, 110 Belgium, 63
Denmark, 172 Netherlands and 58 Norway). The upgrade involves fitting a
Block 50 C/D model style cockpit, wide angle HUD, NVG compatible
lighting and displays, a new mission computer, a digital terrain
system, provisions for FLIR night vision equipment and microwave
landing system.
The venerable F-111 will soldier on in the USAF, as it
appears. The deployment of the F-15E saw the older model F-111E, F-111D
and F-111G retired, leaving the F-111F and EW EF-111A in service,
operations consolidated in the single overstrength 27th TFW at Cannon
AFB in New Mexico. Interestingly, the USAF's leadership given the
choice of retiring either B-52s or F-111Fs, opted to retain the F-111F
due its Pave Tack capability. Media reports in this country of the
impending demise of the remainder of the fleet are alas somewhat
exaggerated, particularly as the EF-111A jammers are the only assets of
their kind and will thus continue in service for at least another
decade or longer. Fears of the RAAF losing its spares access are
therefore unfounded and one could argue the result of political
mischief in this country, compounded by irresponsible reporting.
The most bizzare proposal in relation to the F-111 is that
suggested by a Canberra academic, that the RAAF's newly acquired F-111G
aircraft should be broken up for spares, so as not to upset our
neighbours. In the context of mutually supporting regional defence
forces, such a move would guarantee a measure of upset, and no doubt
convince our neighbours that we are quite irrational !
While the US and NATO countries are carrying out what are
generally modest upgrades to their front line inventories, the
situation is rather different with operators of second tier export
fighters, be they of US or Soviet origin. Most of these are in Asia,
and that will be the subject of Part 2.
Part 2
The decline in defence
budgets which has occurred since the collapse of the USSR, as well as
the saturation of the fighter marketplace with second hand aircraft,
have created a boom in the fighter upgrade business. Systems
integrators worldwide have taken advantage of the in the
marketplace, and virtually no type in substantial use has escaped their
attention. Part 2 will examine upgrade programs under way or being
proposed in Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.
Asian and Asia-Pacific
Upgrades
Asian air forces are largely equipped with Western equipment,
if we disregard India, a long time Soviet customer, China, who reverse
engineered a range of Soviet equipment, and North Korea and Vietnam.
Both the North Koreans and Vietnamese are in questionable economic
circumstances, while China's continueing contempt for Western
sensitivities about human rights has largely restricted access to their
market.
The dominant fighter aircraft in US supplied Asian inventories
are the F-16A/B and F-5E/F, both low cost export fighters sold by the
US in the seventies and eighties. Both of these types have relatively
austere avionic fits, both designed with seventies technology, and thus
prime candidates for upgrades.
The Far East in now in the throws of a major economic boom, as
they enter the early phases of industrialisation, and not unlike
Western nations in that phase of social evolution, they too are
indulging in the expensive luxury of arms races.
Taiwan has recently ordered 150 F-16 aircraft and 60 Mirage
2000-5 strike aircraft, in response to mainland China's acquisition of
the formidable Su-27 Flanker. In relation to the latter, a not
unexpected development is China's attempt to acquire the manufacturing
technology to licence build these aircraft. The result has been a
sudden demand throughout the region for new aircraft and to a degree.
upgrades, although Taiwanese plans to upgrade up to 200 existing
fighters have been abandoned with the acquisition of the new aircraft.
South Korean interest in upgrading their F-5E/F fleet has been
suspended while licenced assembly of the F-16 is a high priority. A
modest structural upgrade of 27 dual F-5Bs will be carried out in the
meantime, and many observers are optimistic about follow on upgrades to
the later E/F model. The Koreans had initiated an upgrade of their
F-4D/E force, contracting Rockwell to fit the Westinghouse APG-68
radar, but this program is reported to be stalled due funding problems.
The third major player in the Far East, Japan, is carrying out
an extensive upgrade program to 100 of their F-4EJ Kai aircraft, this
involving an APG-66J radar common to the F-16, Litton LN-39 INS, a
Kaiser HUD and Hazeltine APX-79A IFF equipment. A locally developed
J/APR-4Kai RWR will also be fitted, replacing the now obsolete ALR-46,
and a Mitsubishi/Melco version of the Thomson-CSF Astac Elint system
(used on the Mirage F.1CR) will be fitted to upgraded RF-4EJs.
Closer to Europe, the Turkish Air Force has issued an RFP for
upgrades to 60 of its older F-5A/B aircraft, with the intention of
using these as conversion trainers to the F-16 force. The upgrade is
extensive and involves a doubling of airframe life through structural
rebuilding, and the fitting of a glass cockpit, RLG INS and a
GEC-Marconi wide angle HUD. The Turks are also planning a upgrade to 54
of their F-4 aircraft, involving structural life extension and the
fitting of new radar and EW equipment.
Jordan planned to upgrade 23 of its F-5E/F aircraft, financing
the scheme through the would be sale of four airframes to Indonesia.
This has not transpired due US unhappiness about Indonesian behaviour
in East Timor, resulting in the planned sale being blocked. The
Jordanian upgrade would see either the APG-66T or APG-67(E) radar
fitted, an RWR and HOTAS controls. Earlier upgrades to the Jordanian
aircraft saw the fitting of BAe LINS 300 laser INS and the Selenia
ALQ-234 EW pod.
Jordan's neighbour, Israel, is carrying out an extensive
upgrade to the F-4E, the Kurnass/Phantom 2000 program involving the
fitting of an Elbit nav/attack system built around an ACE-3 mission
computer and dual redundant Mil-Std-1553B databusses, El-OP/Kaiser wide
angle holographic HUD and Norden radar, and range of detail
improvements including built in test facilities and reworked
hydraulics. The Norden radar is a particularly sophisticated item with
synthetic aperture high resolution surface mapping, using technology
developed for the cancelled A-6G. A more ambitious upgrade offered by
the Israelis is the Super Phantom, which is fitted with a pair of
PW1120 turbojets, which offer additional thrust at a reduced weight,
against the fifties technology J-79s. The IDF had originally planned to
re-engine its F-4E fleet, but the cancellation of the Lavi program
escalated the price of the engines to the point where the F-4 upgrade
was deemed too expensive.
Israel has applied its skills to the Mirage as well as the
Skyhawk, and Israeli contractors are offering upgrades to both types.
The Mirage III/V airframe can be fitted with Kfir undercarriage,
canards, an additional fuselage fuel tank and a Kfir style forward
fuselage. The latter can house additional nav-attack avionics, such as
the WDNS-391 inertial nav-attack system. EW equipment can be fitted,
including both RWRs and chaff/flare dispensers. More comprehensive
packages on offer include the GE/Flygmotor F404/RM12 12,000/18,000 lb
thrust turbofan, and the Elta EL/M-2011/2032 pulse Doppler radars and
Mil-Std-1553B bussing.
Indonesia is a long time user of the F-5E/F and reports
suggest that they are interested in refitting the aircraft with a new
HUD, INS, mission computer and Mil-Std-1553B databus. Five TNI-AU
aircraft have already been fitted with the late model APG-157(V)5
radar. The possibility of these aircraft being refitted with a new
Emerson APG-69 radar is being discussed in the trade press.
Malaysia is also considering its position in relation to
upgrades, although it is unclear as to what money will be available
given their recent commitment to purchase the MiG-29 Fulcrum and a
small number of F/A-18D strike fighters. The RMAF has 32 ex-USN
Skyhawks in service, and is considering refitting these with
F-404-GE-100D fans as has been done by the Singaporeans, and fitting
either the BAe LINS300 or Litton ASN-139 INS. Reports suggest even more
ambitious plans, including an avionic upgrade not unlike that done to
the RNZAF A-4 force. Of the original 88 strong RMAF fleet, 40 were
upgraded by Grumman to A-4PTM standard with a Ferranti HUD, Hughes
Angle Rate Bombing System (ARBS) common to the AV-8B, Lear Siegler AHRS
and provisions for AIM-9J and AGM-65 Maverick.
Singapore has completed its extensive upgrade to its A-4
fleet. The Singaporean program saw non-afterburning F404-GE-100D fans
fitted in a Phase I upgrade, followed by a GEC-Ferranti 4150 HUD, glass
cockpit and a Litton LN-93 laser INS. The upgraded aircraft are
designated the A-4S-1 Super Skyhawk. Singapore has also had eight of
its F-5E aircraft upgraded to Tigereye tac recce configuration, with a
camera pallet fitted in a rebuilt nose section. Unconfirmed reports
suggest a radar equipped A-4 is nearing initial deployment.
New Zealand completed its extensive A-4K Kahu upgrade program
in late 1990, with the aircraft receiving an APG-66(NZ) radar, largely
common to the F-16, HOTAS controls, GI ALR-66 RWR, Ferranti 4150
HUDWAC, Litton LN-93 RLG INS, VOR/ILS nav and Tracor ALE-39 dispenser.
The aircraft are tasked with maritime strike and CAIRS, and the AGM-65
Maverick is carried (the author had the pleasure of a guided tour of
the A-4K courtesy of the RNZAF in 1992 - how the Kiwis got everything
to fit in is quite astounding !). An interesting aspect of Kiwi
operations is their use of the scene-magnification Maverick missile for
target identification beyond Eyeball Mk.1 range.
The Communist Red Chinese PLA has also sought to modernise its
largely obsolescent fleet of cloned Soviet designs. Whilst much effort
has been poured into the acquisition of the capable Su-27 and the SA-10
Grumble (S-300) Patriot class SAM, a continueing problem will be the
existing fleet of A-5, J-6 (MiG-19), J-7 (MiG-21) and J-8 II Finback
aircraft. The newer J-8 family, an interesting blend of MiG-19 and
MiG-21 technology, was to have been fitted with a sophisticated suite
of Grumman integrated avionics. This program collapsed after the
Chinese government crushed students under tank treads in 1989. The
West's withdrawal from an increasingly hostile China has created an
opportunity for the Russians, who are reported to have up to 5,000
technical support staff in the country. Whether Russian assistance will
translate into upgrades for older types remains to be seen. The 4,000+
strong J-6/J-7/J-8 fleet is at the limit of its tactical viability.
Unconfirmed reports suggest plans for Chinese acquisition of Tu-22M
Backfire strategic bombers, while other reports implied an intention to
refit the Chinese Xian H-6 (Tu-16) Badger fleet with inflight
refuelling facilities.
Nevertheless, some Western integrators are still eyeing China
as a potential market. Reports suggest that GEC-Marconi may offer the
Blue Hawk pulse Doppler radar for use in an F-7 upgrade program.
Long time adversaries India and Pakistan have also been active
with upgrades. The Pakistanis have contracted Sagem to modernise 15
Mirage IIIEP and RP aircraft with a MAESTRO (Modular Avionics
Enhancement System Targeted for Retrofit Operations - a mouthful by any
standard !) package, derived from Sagem's Mirage V package for the
Belgian Air Force, which was to proceed but had its aircraft retired
from under it. The PAF Mirage Vs are also to acquire a pulse Doppler
radar, although the type has not been reported.
The PAF will also be fitting the Fiar Grifo 7 monopulse
anti-shipping/AI radar to part of its Chinese built F/J-7 fleet. Much
of the PAF F/J-7 fleet is equipped with factory fitted GEC-Marconi 956
HUD/WACs and 226 Skyranger ranging radars.
The Indian air force is reported to be contemplating a major
upgrade of up to 120 of its large MiG-21 Fishbed fleet. Several
contenders exist for this lucrative program. The official Russian
sponsored MiG company proposal would see the Russian Mikoyan Bureau
integrating a substantially French supplied avionic suite. Details are
unclear, but reports suggest the use of Thomson-CSF and Sextant Avionic
HUD, central computer, RLG, radar altimeter, RWR and ECM.
The Russians' principal competitor in this bid are seen to be
the Israelis, with their MiG-21-2000 program. Israel's IAI have
successfully won a bid to upgrade no less than 100 of Romania's MiG-21
fleet. The upgrade involves fitting a single piece windshield, a
Martin-Baker ejection seat, glass cockpit, El-Op HUD, and an Elta
EL/M-2030 series AI radar, which replaces the decrepid Soviet Jay-Bird
radar. The later look-down pulse Doppler 2030 series radars are derived
from the cancelled Lavi project, and support the Israeli Python-3
heatseeking missile.
The Israelis have been quick to exploit the growing upgrade
market. IAI are also upgrading Chile's F-5 fleet with a similar package
to the MiG-21. The Chilean upgrade is centred on the EL/M-2032B radar,
glass cockpit displays, a Mil-Std-1553B bus tied to a central computer,
an El-Op HUD and HOTAS controls.
Other contenders in the IAF MiG-21 upgrade program are
GEC-Marconi, bidding a Blue Hawk radar and GEC HUD and glass cockpit,
Sagem, India's HAL and at least two other bidders have been reported.
Nearer to home, the RAAF's F-111C Avionic Upgrade Program
(AUP) is progressing quietly, although somewhat behind originally
planned schedules. The RAAF's upgrade has not been widely publicised,
but involves a comprehensive rework of the avionic system. The new
avionic architecture will be structured around a pair of mission
computers, with redundant Mil-Std-1553B busses, and glass cockpit
displays will replace much of the conventional instrumentation. A
modern INS will be fitted, replacing the vintage LN-14, and plans are
under way to fit a comprehensive new EW system. Australian Aviation
will provide a comprehensive review of the AUP as the program nears
completion.
The RAAF's F/A-18A/B fleet has also been quietly brought
closer to F/A-18C/D standard, including the ALR-67 RWR. The RAAF
aircraft differ from the USN C/D model primarily in the use of the
older, lower thrust engines, and the original radar, for which the US
did not provide software source code. AAS-38 Flir/laser pods for LGB
targeting and designation are being fitted. Upgrades are the current
trend, for very good reasons, and it is interesting to see how well
some of the smaller integrators have adapted to the new marketplace,
which the larger defence contractors are still grappling with. What is
certain is that many of the fighter types we have come to know well
during the last two decades will soldier on, with smarter systems and
improved capabilities.
A thought to contemplate is whether Australian systems
integrators should become more involved in this growing market. The
payoff is certainly there.
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