On Bullshit is an essay by philosopher Harry Frankfurt. Originally published in the journal Raritan in 1986, the essay was republished as a separate volume in 2005 and became a nonfiction bestseller, spending twenty-seven weeks on the New York Times Best Seller list.^[1]

In the essay, Frankfurt sketches a theory of bullshit, defining the concept and analyzing its applications. In particular, Frankfurt distinguishes bullshitting from lying; while the liar deliberately makes false claims, the bullshitter is simply uninterested in the truth. Bullshitters aim primarily to impress and persuade their audiences. While liars need to know the truth, the better to conceal it, the bullshitter, interested solely in advancing his own agenda, has no use for the truth. Following from this, Frankfurt claims that "bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are."

Could the highly developed marketing strategies and new age management doctrines such as the Pentagon’s much vaunted but mathematically unsupportable concept of CAIV (Cost As an Independent Variable) and its logic flawed implementation within the JSF Program actually have been a way of generating the alternate realities and comfortable fictions that are the tools of trade of ‘the B-word’ artisans?

Would it be possible the Goldilocks Pricing Strategy with its apples versus lemons comparison with the F-22A Raptor and the creation of a Prisoner’s Dilemma as a follow on to the JSF Program’s early capture of the political leaderships within the partner nations be additional means for reinforcing the easy going perceptions of these alternate realities?

Independent costing and risks analyses based on data compiled well before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and its much larger, more rapacious offspring, the World Economic Crisis (WEC), strongly support answers in the affirmative to all such questions. 

Will the WEC now be used to explain away cost increases and delays in schedule which were already inherent in the program or even to justify more outlandish calls for additional funding and even more time to complete?  Surely not, for a quite alarming and frightening reason.

If the new US Administration is coerced by such behaviour, as ’the B-word’ is designed to do, and ends up endorsing the JSF Program in its present form with its current and ongoing agendas like white anting all competition, including the F-22A Raptor, this program will likely make the WEC, itself another product of ‘the B-word’, look like a mere stumble ^[1].

However, the big difference with the WEC is that the resulting damages and effects will be very long term but limited to only one half of the globe; the now most practiced proliferators of  ‘the B-word’ itself - namely, the Western world.

If this is the legacy left to our children, they will damn us all, not just those responsible, into and beyond our graves.

Endnotes:

Annex - Examples of Some of the Questions put to the JSF Community in the Interests of a Strong Debate

1. In US dollars, what was the pre-WEC estimate of the unit procurement cost (UPC) for the Block 3 Configuration F-35A JSF aircraft planned to be delivered in 2014?
   
2. Does this price estimate include any dollar amounts to cover any developmental or procurement or other risks?
   
3. If so, what are these risks and what amounts of money, in 2014 US dollars, have been allocated (in cost per aircraft terms, please) to cover each of these risks?

1. Why has the range of weapon types intended under SDD been so dramatically scaled back?
   
2. Is not moving the certification of the remaining weapons out of the SDD Phase and into the Operational Phase what, in keeping with modern day Risk Management Standards such as AS/NZS4360:2004, should be called Extreme Risk?
   
3. The weapon bay configuration of the JSF with its canted carriage (about 5 degrees nose in to the centreline, I believe) and forward centroid location (both mass and aerodynamic) relative to the aircraft’s CoG range, also presents significant risk to the carriage and clearance of weapons from these bays.  
   
4. How is LM planning to mitigate all such risks to the clearance of weapons from these bays?
   
5. How does the JSF Program intend to accommodate internal carriage of more than two AAMs, and how many will the aircraft be able to ultimately carry internally and deliver?
   
6. Will each of the JSF weapon bays accommodate the carriage and delivery of 4 x SDB + an AAM and, if so, when will this be certificated?
   
7. What are the in flight opening/closing times for the weapon bay doors?

1. What threat Surface to Air Missile systems and supporting radars was the JSF’s stealth capability modelled against, and which was it not modelled against?  For your convenience, a summary of the threat systems may be found here.
   
2. What threat combat aircraft types and supporting systems was JSF’s stealth and aerodynamic capability modelled against, and which was it not modelled against?  A range of the threat combat aircraft and supporting system may be found here.
   
3. Why did the JSF Program discard the flat lower centre fuselage design of the X-35, and replace it with the complex curvature design of the SDD F-35, given that even the basic RCS modelling shows this would adversely impact the stealthiness of the aircraft when illuminated from its side aspect?
   
4. Why does the JSF Program believe that opposing threat systems will not use all of their capabilities to survive when confronted by the JSF in combat?
   
5. Where is the JSF escape system (pilot ejection system) in its certification program and when do you expect the system to be certificated?
   
6. What will be the envelope of the JSF pilot ejection system?
   
7. What will be the maximum speed at which the JSF canopy will be certificated for bird strikes?

1. What is the estimated total cost per flying hour, in USD/FH, for the Block 3 F-35A JSF in 2014 for a per aircraft flying rate of 350 hrs per annum and a fleet size of 100 aircraft performing all training missions and roles that achieves a level of preparedness able to fully utilise the full JSF capabilities, with repeatability?
   
2. What are the JSF capabilities, training sequences and rates of effort (ROEs) used to determine the answer to the preceding question?
   
3. Which organisation or organisations will have the ability and capabilities to control and change the technical configurations of the JSF and its airborne and ground based systems?
   
4. By all accounts, including using some of the tools you and I were trained in at USNTPS, the approach speed of the F-35A is inordinately high – reportedly 180 KCAS.  Is this the case?
   
5. If so, what modelling/simulations have been done to determine the levels of risk and hazards such a high approach speed presents to the operations and support of the F-35A JSF?
   
6. What is the means of controlling the temperatures of the ElectroHydroStatic Actuators (EHSA) used to drive the F-35 JSF control surfaces and are these actuators rated for a continuous duty cycle at a loading above 100% of the JSF operational loading?  If not, what is their duty cycle rating?