Strategic Context

Both the Almaz S-300P/S-400 (SA-10, SA-20) and Antey S-300V (SA-12) SAM systems  grew out of the disappointments of Vietnam and the Yom Kippur wars, where single digit S-75/SA-2, S-125/SA-3 and 3M9/SA-6 series SAMs were soundly defeated in combat by the US and Israelis respectively. Designed for the high density battlespace of late Cold War central Europe, the S-300P and S-300V series of SAMs represent the pinnacle of Soviet Cold War era SAM technology, with no effort spared to push the technological envelope. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, both systems have continued to evolve, benefitting immeasurably from large scale access to Western technology markets, and Western computational technology to support further design effort. Against the current benchmark in Western SAM technology, the Raytheon Patriot PAC-3 system, both the S-300P and S-300V series remain highly competitive.

5V28E / SA-5 Gammon

It should come as no surprise that the US publicly expressed concerns about the possibility of Serbia and Iraq acquiring these systems prior to the OAF and OIF air campaigns - the presence of these systems could have dramatically changed the nature of both air campaigns. With superb missile kinematics, high power-aperture phased array radar capability, high jam resistance and high mobility, the S-300P series and S-300V would have required unusually intense defence suppression effort, changing the character and duration of both air campaigns. The political fracas surrounding the Cypriot order for S-300PMU1, and the long standing intent of both North Korea and Iran to purchase large numbers of late model S-300P underscore this point.

In US terminology, the double digit S-300P series and S-300V systems represent anti-access capabilities - designed to make it unusually difficult if not impossible to project air power into defended airspace. The B-2A and F/A-22A were both developed with these threat systems in mind, and are still considered to be the only US systems capable of robustly defeating these weapons. The technique for defeating them is a combination of wideband all aspect stealth and highly sensitive radio-frequency ESM receivers, combined with offboard sources of near-realtime Intelligence Surveillance Reconaissance (ISR) data on system locations.

Aircraft with no stealth, reduced RCS capabilities, or limited aspect stealth, such as the F-15E, F-16C, F/A-18E/F, Eurofighter Typhoon and JSF are all presented with the reality that high to medium altitude penetration incurs a very highly risk of engagement by either of these weapon systems. It is perhaps ironic that the only reliable defence for aircraft lacking top tier all aspect stealth capability is high speed low altitude terrain masking using Terrain Following Radar, supplemented by offboard near-realtime ISR data, support jamming and standoff missiles. Australia's F-111s, if used cleverly, are arguably much more survivable against this class of technology than the vast majority of newer types in service - it should come as no surprise that the Bundes-Luftwaffe in Germany developed the terrain following Tornado ECR Wild Weasel precisely around this regime of attack on the SA-10/20/12.

That the Canberra DoD leadership opted four years ago to wholly ignore the regional arrival of the S-300P/S-300V series SAMs in their long term force structure planning is nothing less than remarkable and raises some very serious questions about how well the capabilities of these systems are actually understood in the halls of Russell Offices. Despite repeated proposals by a great many parties, there are no plans to equip the RAAF with anti-radiation missiles or support jamming aircraft, there is an ongoing drive for early F-111 retirement, and the F/A-22A Raptor, the US solution to the S-300P/S-300V problem, is generally dismissed as being too good for Australia.

Unlike Sukhoi Su-27/30 fighters which many expect will require a robust support infrastructure, intensive training, good tactics and talented fighter pilots to operate, all taking time to mature into a viable capability, the S-300P/S-300V series SAMs were designed for austere support environments, to be operated and maintained largely by Soviet era conscripts. Therefore the integration of these weapons into wider and nearer regional force structures will not incur the delays and difficulties expected by some observers with the Sukhois. A package of S-300P/S-300V batteries could be operationally viable within months of deployment in the region, and earlier if contract Russian or Ukrainian personnel are hired to bring them online faster. The notion of fifteen years warning time looks a little absurd, given that these systems can proliferate and operationally mature as capabilities within one to two years.

With the first generation of these SAMs deployed during the early 1980s, currently marketed variants are third and fourth generation evolutions of the basic design, mature systems built with characteristic Russian robustness and simplicity where possible.

In recent years the accelerated marketing tempo of the desperate Russian industry has seen a surprisingly large amount of detailed technical material on these weapons appear in the public domain, with publications like Military Parade, Vestnik PVO and Russkaya Sila posting detailed summaries and data on Internet websites, albeit mostly accessible only to readers of Russian. Other former Warpac nations have also been surprisingly open in sharing information on these weapons. Given the availability of this data it is now possible to compile more comprehensive analyses of these weapons, than of equivalent US products such as the Patriot. This analysis is based largely upon Russian sources.

The arrival of S-300P and S-300V missile systems in the region radically changes the strategic environment, both from the perspective of the US and Australia. These highly capable systems are not invincible, but require significant investment into capabilities to defeat them - prohibitive losses in aircraft and aircrew otherwise might occur. As they are less demanding to operate than modern combat aircraft, operators across the broader region will be able to achieve combat effective proficiency faster than with the Su-27/30. In practical terms the S-300P/S-300V SAMs are a viable deterrent against air forces without the technological and intellectual capital to tackle them - and in many respects better value for money than the Su-27/30. Their failure to sell in larger numbers reflects more than anything poor marketing by Russia's industry.

The US Air Force's approach to defeating these SAMs is conceptually simple: the F/A-22A exploiting its all aspect wideband stealth, supercruise, high altitude and sensitive ESM warning capability will kill the engagement and acquisition radars using guided weapons. High power standoff support jamming will be provided by B-52H aircraft equipped with electronically steerable high power jamming pods, and standoff ISR support will be provided by systems such as the RC-135V/W, E-8C and new E-10 MC2A. Standoff or highly stealthy ISR capabilities will be necessary - the current generation of high altitude UAVs like the RQ-1B and RQ-4A are not survivable in airspace covered by the S-300P/S-300V systems.

Conventional unstealthy, or partially stealthy combat aircraft will have difficulty surviving within the coverage of the S-300P/S-300V systems - the high transmit power, large radar and missile seeker apertures, low sidelobes, generous use of monopulse angle tracking and extensive ECCM features make these systems difficult to jam effectively. Self protection jammers will need to produce relatively high X-band power output, and exploit monopulse angle tracking deception techniques - Digital RF Memory techniques with high signal fidelity are nearly essential. Even so the challenges in defeating these systems with a self protection jammer are not trivial - raw power-aperture does matter in this game.

In practical terms, low level terrain masking to remain below the radar horizon of these systems, combined with good standoff ISR, support jamming and a low radar signature standoff missile, is the only reliable defence for an aircraft with anything greater than insect sized all aspect radar signature. For instance the JSF's forward sector stealth is likely to be adequate, but its aft sector stealth performance may not be, especially considering the wavelengths of many of the radars in question - a JSF driver runs a real risk of taking a 3,000 lb hypersonic SAM up his tailpipe if he cannot kill the target SAM engagement radar in his first pass. For the JSF, integration of a terrain following radar mode in its AESA radar is not an unusual technical challenge, incurring only modest development cost. The bigger bite will be in shortened airframe fatigue life resulting from fast low level penetration with a modestly swept wing design.

Of the current crop of fighters in Western service, the most survivable are those with good TFRs - the F-111, Tornado and F-15E if fitted with the LANTIRN TFR pod - all requiring a high performance EW suite.

A weakness of both the S-300P/S-300V systems is that they are severely radar horizon limited in a fully mobile configuration. The addition of mast mounted acquisition radars to extend their low level footprint severely impairs the mobility of the battery.

The popular idea of shooting cruise missiles, anti-radiation missiles or standoff missiles at the S-300P/S-300V battery, assuming its location is known, is only viable where such a weapon has a sufficiently low radar signature to penetrate inside the minimum engagement range of the SAM before being detected - anything less will see the inbound missile killed by a self defensive SAM shot. The current Russian view of this is to sell Tor M1/SA-15 Gauntlet self-propelled point defence SAM systems as a rapid reaction close in defensive system to protect the S-300P/S-300V battery by shooting down the incoming missile if it gets past the S-300P/S-300V SAMs.

In summary, current RAAF force structure plans do not provide for a robust long term capability to defeat the S-300P/S-300V class of SAMs - weapons which are very likely to be encountered during coalition operations, and most likely, regional operations over the coming two or more decades. If the RAAF wishes to remain competitive in this developing regional environment, further intellectual and material investment will be needed.

The earliest origins of the S-300P series lie in the mid 1960s, when the Soviet Voyska PVO and Ministry of Military Production initiated its development. The aim was to produce an area defence SAM system capable of replacing the largely ineffective S-75/SA-2 Guideline and S-200/SA-5 Gammon systems, neither of which performed well against low flying Wild Weasels, low RCS targets or US support jamming aircraft. The original intent was to design a common SAM system for the Voyska-PVO (Air Defence Forces), Voenno-Morskiy Flot (Navy) and the PVO-SV (Air Defence Corps of the Red Army) but divergent service needs across these three users soon saw commonality drop well below 50%. Ultimately the V-PVO's S-300P series and PVO-SV's S-300V series diverged so completely to become largely unique systems.

30N6 / 40V6M Flap Lid A

The design aims of the original S-300P were to produce a strategic area defence SAM system, intended to protect fixed targets such as government precincts, industrial facilities, command posts and headquarters, military bases, strategic and tactical airfields and nuclear sites. This weapon system was to initially defeat SAC's SRAM firing FB-111As, B-52Hs and then anticipated B-1As, and later the Boeing AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile. The deployment model of the first generation systems was based on the existing S-75/SA-2, S-125/SA-3 and S-200/SA-5 systems, with a semi-mobile package of towed trailer mounted radars and missile Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL).

The S-300P introduced some important technological innovations. The first generation V-500/5V55 missile used a single stage solid rocket motor, and conceptually is closest to the baseline US Army MIM-104 Patriot. The missile was deployed and handled in a sealed cylindrical launch tube/canister, with a cold start gas generator used to eject the missile vertically before its motor was initiated. The 5P85 TEL was a semi-trailer arrangement, with the forward booms splayed when deployed as stabilisers. The four launch tubes were mounted on a hydraulically elevated frame, retained in later TEL designs. A typical battery would be equipped with three 5P85 TELs, each with four SAMs, or double the SAM complement of the S-75/SA-2 it replaced and permitting 2 rounds per launch.

The first generation of the S-300P's 30N6 Flap Lid A engagement/fire control radar was also innovative, and clearly influenced by the Raytheon MPQ-53 engagement radar for the MIM-104 Patriot. The Flap Lid, like the MPQ-53, uses a transmissive passive shifter technology phased array, with a space (a.k.a. optical) feed into the rear plane of the antenna, using a microwave lens rather than a horn feed. The Flap Lid's antenna stows flat on the roof of the radar cabin, which was initially deployed on a trailer towed by a Ural-357, KrAZ-255 or KrAZ-260 6x6 tractor. The whole radar cabin is mounted on a turntable and used to slew the phased array to cover a 60 degree sector of interest.

MPQ-53 Patriot

The 30N6 was a huge generational leap in technology from the Fan Song, Low Blow and Square Pair mechanically steered and scanned engagement radars on preceding V-PVO SAMs. With electronic beam steering, very low sidelobes and a narrow pencil beam mainlobe, the 30N6 phased array is more difficult to detect and track by an aircraft's warning receiver when not directly painted by the radar, and vastly more difficult to jam. While it may have detectable backlobes, these are likely to be hard to detect from the forward sector of the radar. As most anti-radiation missiles rely on sidelobes to home in, the choice of engagement geometry is critical in attempting to kill a Flap Lid.

Unlike the Patriot's MPQ-53 engagement radar which has substantial autonomous search capability, the 30N6  is primarily an engagement radar designed to track targets and guide missiles to impact using a command link channel. The absence of dedicated directional antennas on this system indicates that the commands are transmitted via a specialised waveform emitted by the main array. The first generation of the 5V55K missile was command link guided, following the design philosophy of the S-75/SA-2 and S-125/SA-3, with a cited range of 25 nautical miles and altitude limits between 80 ft and 80,000 ft.

S-300PT 5P85PT TEL

This variant was designated the S-300PT (P - PVO, T -Transportiruyemiy) and incrementally upgraded models the S-300PT-1, it entered service in 1978. NATO labelled it the SA-10A Grumble.

Two search and acquisition radars were introduced to support the S-300PT, both with 360 degree coverage. The 3D 36D6/ST-68UM/5N59 Tin Shield was used for high and medium altitude targets, and the 2D 76N6 Clam Shell for low altitude low RCS targets (refer AA 10/95 for detailed analysis).

36D6 Tin Shield

The 36D6 Tin Shield is semimobile and towed by a KrAZ-255 or -260 tractor, it can be deployed or stowed in one hour, or two with the mast. The design uses a large paraboloid cylindrical section primary reflector and a linear element array deployed on a pair of booms to provide electronic beam steering in elevation from -20 to +30 degrees, the antenna can perform a full 360 degree sweep in 5 to 10 seconds. With a transmitter peak power rating cited between 1.23 MegaWatts and 350 kiloWatts, the manufacturer claims the ability to detect a 0.1 square metre RCS target at 300 ft AGL out to 24.8 nautical miles, and at medium to high altitudes to 94.5 nautical miles. Clutter rejection is claimed to exceed 48 dB, and the system can track 100 targets. An IFF system is integrated in the radar.

LEMZ 5N66/5N66M/76N6 Clam Shell (низковысотный обнаружитель)

Its sibling, the 5N66/5N66M/76N6 Clam Shell low level early warning radar, is an unconventional frequency modulated continuous wave design, using a split antenna arrangement with a large beak to prevent spillover from the transmitter. Quoted performance figures include the detection of targets with an RCS as low as 0.02 square metres, at speeds of up to 1,400 kt, with a bearing resolution of 1 degree, velocity resolution of 9.3 kt and range resolution of 2.15 NM. Quoted RMS tracking errors are 0.3 degree in bearing, 4.7 kt in velocity and 1 NM in range. Chaff rejection performance is quoted at better than 100 dB, detection range is stated to be 50 NM for targets at 1,500 ft altitude, and 65 NM for 3,000 ft altitude. The transmitter delivers 1.4 kW of CW power at an unspecified carrier frequency, system MTBF is quoted at 100 hr with an MTTR of 0.5 hr.

76N6 Clam Shell - Click for more ....

5N66M / 76N6 / 40V6M

40V6M Chassis Deployed

5N66M / 76N6 / 40V6MD - this is the extended height mast variant.

An important feature of the S-300PT was the introduction of the semi-mobile 40V6, 40V6M and 40V6MD masts, towed by a MAZ-543 derived tractor, in turn based on the 1966 Scud launcher vehicle. The 23.8 metre tall 40V6, 40V6M could be used to elevate the Clam Shell, Tin Shield and Flap Lid radars to extend their radar horizon and improve clearance in uneven terrain. The double height 37.8 metre tall 40V6MD has been used with the Flap Lid, Clam Shell,  and its recent 96L6 replacement. The masts take 1 to 2 hours to erect. The unique 40V6 series masts permit static or semimobile S-300P series SAM systems extended low level coverage not available in any competing Western designs, and were clearly introduced to defeat SAC's low level FB-111A, B-52G/H and B-1B force - and the AGM-86B cruise missile. These masts continue to be marketed as an accessory for the latest production variants of S-300P radars.

The Tin Shield / Clam Shell / Flap Lid combo provided the V-PVO with the first all altitude acquisition and engagement package on a semi-mobile SAM system and was a key factor driving the development of the F-117A and B-2A bombers. Had the balloon gone up in 1984, the F-117A would have tasked first and foremost with obliterating the V-PVO's S-300P radar systems.

5N63S Mobile Command Post 

The two radars were integrated with a 5N63S mobile command post, carried on an 8x8 MAZ-7910 chassis.

Growing US electronic combat and SEAD capabilities, in the EF-111A Raven and F-4G Weasel forces were clearly considered a serious threat and this spurred the further evolution of the S-300PT system. In 1982 the V-PVO introduced a fully mobile variant of the system, designated the S-300PS (P- PVO, S - Samochodnyy/Self-propelled), labelled by NATO the SA-10B.

30N6 Flap Lid B

30N6 Flap Lid B

5P85SU TEL

The S-300PS saw the 30N6 Flap Lid engagement radar and 5P85 TEL transplanted on to the high mobility 8x8 MAZ-7910 vehicle derived from the MAZ-543. This permitted the engagement radar and TELs to set up for firing in 5 minutes, and rapidly scoot away after a missile shot to evade US Air Force Weasels. Two improved variants of the 5V55 missile were introduced. The 50 nautical mile extended range 5V55KD was supplemented with the 5V55R, the latter using a Track Via Missile (TVM) semi-active seeker similar in concept to the MIM-104 Patriot seeker. The TVM system relays to the ground station radar data produced by the missile seeker, and offers better jam resistance and accuracy against a pure command link guidance package, especially as the missile nears the target. Later variants of the Flap Lid are designated as Radiolokator Podsvieta i Navedeniya (RPN - Illumination and Guidance Radar).

The improved 30N6 Flap Lid B radar had the capability to concurrently engage six targets, and guide two missiles against each target. The phased array beam steering angular range was extended to permit instantaneous coverage of a 90 degree sector, comparable to the SPY-1 Aegis radar.

5P85DU TEL

Improvements were not confined to the radar and missiles. Two variants of the MAZ-7910 based TEL were introduced. The 5P85S with the characteristic large accessory cabin and the supplementary 5P85D TEL/Transloader, were both equipped with 5S18/19 series autonomous electrical power generators. A fully mobile 54K6 command post was introduced, also carried by a MAZ-7910. A typical battery would include one 5P85S TEL, two 5P85D TEL/Transloaders and one mobile 5N63S/30N6 Flap Lid B radar.

The S-300PS/SA-10B was a close technological equivalent to the MIM-104 in all respects, but was significantly more mobile, and offered a better low altitude footprint due to the semimobile mast mounted Tin Shield and Clam Shell systems.

 5P85DU TEL

The next big evolutionary step in the S-300P system was the introduction of the enhanced S-300PM and its export variant the S-300PMU-1/SA-10D, in 1993. The SA-10D was subjected to what Russian sources describe as a deep modernisation with design changes to most key components of the system. The aim was to improve its basic capabilities as a SAM, extend radar and engagement footprints, increase the level of automation in the system, and introduce an anti-ballistic missile capability against ballistic missiles with re-entry speeds of up to 2.8 km/sec. It is intended to engage combat aircraft at all altitudes, cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles, making it an equivalent to the PAC-1 and PAC-2 Patriot variants.

Incremental changes were made to the Flap Lid, yielding the 30N6E1 Tomb Stone variant, capable of guiding the new 48N6 missile, the manufacturer claims an ability to engage targets with an RCS as low as 0.02 square metres at an unspecified range, and an autonomous search capability. The 30N6E1 retains the capability to deploy on the 40V6M mast. An improved 54K6E1 mobile command post was introduced, the 76N6 Clam Shell was retained. While the 36D6 Tin Shield remained available, the S-300PMU-1 introduced the new highly mobile NIIIP 64N6E Big Bird 3D search and acquisition radar, carried on a 8x8 MAZ-7910 series vehicle. The radar can be deployed or stowed in 5 minutes - the booms stow against the array, the outer panels of the array swing inward and the whole antenna stows forward to lie flat on top of the trailer.

48N6 Missile Launch

64N6 Big Bird (радиолокатор обнаружения)

The 64N6E Big Bird is the key to much of the improved engagement capability, and ballistic missile intercept capability in the later S-300P variants. This system operates in the 2 GHz band and is a phased array with a 30% larger aperture than the US Navy SPY-1 Aegis radar, even accounting for its slightly larger wavelength it amounts to a mobile land based Aegis class package. It has no direct equivalent in the West.

Like other components of the system, the 64N6E has a number of unique and lateral design features. The radar antenna is mounted on a cabin, in turn mounted on a turntable permitting 360 degree rotation. Unlike Western phased arrays in this class, the 64N6 uses a reflective phased array with a front face horn feed, the horn placed at the end of the long boom which protects the waveguides to the transmitters and receivers in the cabin. The beam steering electronics are embedded inside the antenna array, which has around 2700 phase elements on either face. This Janus faced arrangement permits the Big Bird to concurrently search two 90 degree sectors, in opposite directions, using mechanical rotation to position the antenna and electronic beam steering in azimuth and elevation. This design technique permits incremental growth in output power as the only components of the system which have to handle high microwave power levels are the waveguide and feed horn.

The 64N6E is a frequency hopper, and incorporates additional auxiliary antenna/receiver channels for suppression of sidelobe jammers - NIIP claim the ability to measure accurate bearing to jamming sources. The back end processing is Moving Target Indicator (MTI), and like the Aegis the system software can partition the instantaneous sector being covered into smaller zones for specific searches. To enhance MTI performance the system can make use of stored clutter returns from multiple preceding sweeps. Detection ranges for small fighter targets are of the order of 140 to 150 nautical miles for early variants. Per 12 second sweep 200 targets can be detected, and either six or twelve can be individually tracked for engagements.

Early production Big Bird A configuration - deployed.

64N6E Deployed

While the Big Bird provides an excellent acquisition capability against aerial and ballistic missile targets, the 5V55 missile was inadequate. The S-300PM/PMU-1 introduced the 48N6 which has much better kinematics - cited range against aerial targets is 81 nautical miles, ballistic missile targets 21.5 nautical miles, with a minimum engagement range of 1.6 to 2.7 nautical miles. Low altitude engagement capabilities were improved - down to 20 - 30 ft AGL. The missile speed peaks at 2,100 metres/sec or cca Mach 6. The missiles can be fired at 3 second intervals, and Russian sources claim a single shot kill probability of 80% to 93% for aerial targets, 40% to 85% for cruise missiles and 50% to 77% for TBMs.

A typical S-300PM/PMU-1 battery comprises a 30N6E1 engagement radar, a 76N6 low level early warning / acquisition radar and up to twelve 5P85S/5P85T (SE/TE export variant) TELs, each with four 48N6 rounds. A PVO battalion then combines up to six batteries, using a shared 64N6E acquisition radar, supported by a 54K6E command post.

The PRC has to date been the principal export client for the system, acquiring between 4 and 6 batteries of the S-300PMU between 1991 and 1994, and supplementing these with further buys. The PLA's systems include both fully mobile 5P85SU/DU and road mobile 5P85T series TELs. The total PLA inventory has not been disclosed publicly. The most recent buy has been of two S-300F/SA-N-6 navalised systems for the PLA-N. The principal impediment to export sales numbers has remained cost - a well equipped battery is typically cited at around US$100 million.

96L6E Cheese Board Deployed

An option for the S-300PS/PMU, S-300PM/PMU-1 and follow-on S-300PMU-2 cited by two Russian manufacturers is the new LEMZ 96L6 Cheese Board early warning and acquisition radar, a planar array design with electronic beam steering in elevation and mechanical steering in azimuth. It is intended as a replacement for the Tin Shield and Clam Shell. The 96L6/96L6E is available in semi-mobile towed versions, a semi-mobile mast mounted version using variants of the 40V6M/MD, and a fully mobile version on an 8x8 MZKT-7930 vehicle, based on the MAZ-543M chassis. LEMZ claim a detection range of 160 nautical miles, and the ability to track up to 100 targets, an IFF array is colocated with the antenna. The system has an interface for digital data transmission directly to a 30N6E/E1/E2 Flap Lid, using cabled links to the S-300PMU/PMU-1 and optical fibre cables or microwave links to the S-300PMU-2. Deployment and stow time is 5 minutes for the mobile variant, and 30 to 120 minutes for the semi-mobile and mast mounted variants respectively.

S-400 Triumf / SA-21 Growler battery on the move (Russian MoD)

Almaz S-400 Triumf / SA-21 Growler
Самоходный Зенитный Ракетный  Комплекс  С-400 'Триумф'

The Almaz S-400 Triumf or SA-21 Growler system is the subsequent evolution of the S-300PMU-2, trialled in 1999. The label S-400 is essentially marketing, since the system was previously reported under the speculative label of S-300PMU-3. At least one report claims that funding for the development of the Triumf was provided in part by the PLA.

The principal distinctions between the S-400 and its predecessor lie in further refinements to the radar and software, and the addition of three new missile types in addition to the 48N6E/48N6E2. As a result an S-400 battery could be armed with arbitrary mixes of these weapons to optimise its capability for a specific threat environment. The 30N6E2 further evolved into the more capable 92N2E Grave Stone, carried by a new 8 x 8 MZKT-7930 vehicle. The 96L6 Cheese Board is offered as an 'all altitude' battery acquisition radar, also carried by a 8 x 8 MZKT-7930 vehicle. A new 3D acquisition radar, the 91N6E is employed, and the 40V6MD mast is an available option - this radar is likely to be a replacement for the 64N6E2. The 55K6E command post is employed, carried by an 8 x 8 Ural 532301 truck.

55K6E CP carried by an 8 x 8 Ural 532301 (above) truck, and operator consoles (below) in van  (Almaz-Antey).

LEMZ 96L6 L-band acquisition radar carried by an MZKT-7930 vehicle (Almaz-Antey).

The 92N2E Grave Stone is an evolution of the 30N6 Tomb Stone / Flap Lid series, and is carried by an 8 x 8 MZKT-7930 vehicle (Almaz-Antey/Vestnik PVO).

TEL options include the 5P85TE2 semitrailer, towed by a 6 x 6 BAZ-64022 and improved 5P85SE2. To date photos of the latter have not emerged, EU sources claim the MZKT-7930 is employed - the latter is likely for commonality reasons as it is used for two of the new radars. Demonstrators used the baseline 5P85SE on a MAZ-7910.



The 5P85TE2 TEL towed by a 6 x 6 BAZ-64022 [1], [2] tractor is a distinctive feature of the S-400, making it readily identifiable in comparison with the KrAZ-260 towed 5P85TE variants used with the SA-20 Gargoyle (Almaz-Antey/Vestnik PVO).

Demonstrator configuration of 5P85SE2 TEL (Author)

The first missile added to the system is the 48N6DM (Dalnaya - long range), a long range weapon with a cited range of 215 nautical miles, intended to kill AWACS, JSTARS and other high value assets. Further details of this weapon remain to be disclosed. The range improvement to around twice that of the 48N6E2 suggests a two stage weapon, or a much larger motor casing with a larger propellant load.

The further missiles are in effect equivalents to the ERINT/PAC-3 interceptor missile recently introduced to supplement the MIM-104 in Patriot batteries. These are the 9M96E and 9M96E2, largely identical with the latter version fitted with a larger booster. Fakel claim the 96M6E has a range of 21.6 nautical miles, and the 9M96E2 64.8 nautical miles, with altitude capabilities from 15 ft AGL up to 66 kft and 100 kft respectively.

9M96E and 9M96E2. Below test shot (Almaz-Antey).

The 9M96 missiles are hittiles designed for direct impact, and use canards and thrust vectoring to achieve extremely high G and angular rate capability - they are not unlike a scaled up R-73/AA-11 Archer dogfight missile in concept. An inertial package is used with a datalink from the 30N6E radar for midcourse guidance, with a radar homing seeker of an undisclosed type. The small 53 lb (24 kg) blast fragmentation warhead is designed to produce an controlled fragment pattern, using multiple initiators to shape the detonation wave through the explosive. A smart radio fuse is used to control the warhead timing and pattern. It is in effect a steerable shaped charge.

Almaz S-400M Samodyerzhets 
Самоходный Зенитный Ракетный  Комплекс  С-400M 'Самодержец'

The recently announced 'Samodyerzhets' system is the latest evolution in the S-300PMU family of missiles. It is a fusion of technologies from the S-400 and PVO-SV S-300VM systems, designed as a dual role SAM/ABM system.

Russian sources claimed in 2003 that the system 'combine[s] the far range of the S-300VM missile and the advanced electronics of the S-400 missile'. Jane's identified, in 2004, the use of the extended range 9M82M Giant B round from the S-300VM, in an enhanced S-400 system. The TELAR configuration has yet to be disclosed. We include a diagram of a likely TEL configuration based on the 5P85TE.

Novator 9M82 / SA-12B Giant

The S-300V/SA-12 and S-300VM/Antey-2500, despite sharing designations with the S-300PMU systems, are entirely unique weapons produced originally by Antey, prior to the forced merger of Antey and Almaz. Fully mobile, on tracked chassis based on the MT-TM utility vehicle, the S-300V system was intended to replace the cumbersome 2K11/3M8 Krug/1S12 Long Track/1S32 Pat Hand/SA-4 Ganef system, and provide divisional SAM and ABM capabilities. Design objectives were air defence, defeat of Pershing ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and supersonic standoff missiles like the AGM-69 SRAM.

9M82 Giant SAM

The 9A82 and 9A83 TELARs carry two Novator designed 9M82 Giant long range SAM/ABMs, and four 9M83 Gladiator SAM/ABMs respectively. Each TELAR is equipped with a steerable high gain antenna used to transmit midcourse guidance commands to the missiles and provide continuous wave illumination of the target for the missiles' semi-active radar seekers during the terminal guidance phase - one source cites 10-12 kW of CW power rating. The TELARs are controlled by the 9S32 Grill Pan using either cables or a bidirectional radio datalink, permitting the TELARs to return status information to the guidance radar. The 9A82 TELAR is optimised for engaging targets at higher altitudes, and can slew its antenna through 180 degrees in azimuth, and 110 degrees in elevation, while the 9A83 TELAR has an elevating and telescoping mast providing antenna coverage of the full upper hemisphere - this arrangement is intended to extend the engagement footprint against low altitude targets. The TELARs are supplemented by the 9A84 and 9A85 TEL/Transloaders, essentially dumb launchers which can be used only with guidance/illumination from a nearby TELAR, and equipped with loading cranes instead of antenna booms.

The smaller 9M83 Gladiator SAM/ABM is intended to engage aerial targets at all altitudes, including cruise missiles, and smaller TBMs. The much larger 9M82 Giant has higher kinematic performance and is intended to kill IRBMs, SRAM class supersonic missiles, but also standoff jamming aircraft at long ranges. Both weapons employ two solid propellant stages, with thrust vector control of the first stage (10,225 lb/4,636 kg mass in the Giant and cca 5,000 lb/2275 kg in the Gladiator) and aerodynamic control of the 2,800 lb (1,200 kg) second stage, using four servo driven fins, and four fixed stabilisers. The guidance and control packages, and much of the weapon airframes are identical, the principal distinction being the bigger booster stage of the Giant and its larger stabilisers.

A cold start ejector is used to expel the missile from the launch tube, the first stage burns for about 20 seconds, upon which the missile transitions to its midcourse sustainer. During midcourse flight the missile employs inertial navigation with the option of command link updates. In the former mode it transitions to its semi-active homing seeker during the final 10 seconds of flight, in the latter 3 seconds before impact - a technique preferred for heavy jamming environments. Russian sources claim the semi-active seeker can lock on to a 0.05 square metre RCS target from 16.2 nautical miles. The midcourse guidance system attempts to fly the most energy efficient trajectory to maximise range. A two channel radio proximity fuse is used to initiate the 330 lb (150 kg) class smart warhead which has a controllable fragmentation pattern to maximise effect.

The engagement envelope of the baseline Giant is between 3,200 ft AGL to 100 kft, and ranges of 7 to 54 nautical miles. The system can launch the missiles at 1.5 second intervals, and a battalion with four batteries can engage 24 targets concurrently, with 2 missiles per target, and has a complement of between 96 and 192 missiles available for launch on TELAR/TELs. A TELAR can arm a missile for launch in 15 seconds, with a 40 second time to prepare a TELAR for an engagement, and 5 minute deploy and stow times - a genuine shoot and scoot capability.

The cited single shot kill probabilities for the Giant 40% to 60% against IRBMs and 50% to 70% against the AGM-69 SRAM - ballistic missiles with re-entry velocities of up to 3 km/s can be engaged.

The S-300V has been supplanted by the enhanced S-300VM, using the 9S15M2, 9S19M, 9S32M and 9S457M components, and improved 9M82M and 9M83M missiles. This system has been marketed as the Antey 2500, intended to highlight its capability to engage 2,500 km range IRBMs with re-entry velocities around 4.5 km/sec. The 9M82M has double the range of the 9M82 against aerial targets, at 108 nautical miles, and increased terminal phase agility - a single shot kill probability of 98% is claimed against ballistic targets.