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Updated: Mon Jan 25 00:58:43 UTC 2010
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APA NOTAMS ISSN 1836-7135
F-35
JSF
Program: Assessment of Top Level Programmatic Risks
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Air Power
Australia - Australia's Independent Defence Think Tank
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Air Power Australia NOTAM
19th November,
2009
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| Contacts: |
Peter
Goon
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Carlo
Kopp
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Mob:
0419-806-476 |
Mob:
0437-478-224
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(APA
Image).
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Public
discussion of risks in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program has, to
date, been largely confined to technical risks inherent in the
implementation of the design and production of this aircraft and its
associated systems. The more important matter of top level risks
imposed on nations participating in this troubled program has, until
now, received little if any attention, either in the public debate, or
the internal debates within the acquisition organisations of
participating nations.
Air Power Australia has
sought to deal with this problem, and recently produced an assessment
of top level programmatic risks in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
This assessment was provided to the CEO of Australia's Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO),
in
compliance
with
Air Power
Australia's long standing policy of open and direct
communication with Senior Defence Officials, in line with the
Australian
democratic process.
This assessment should also be
of considerable interest to Dr Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L), and his
peers in other participating nations, as they grapple in coming days
and weeks with the pervasive problems in the F-35 JSF Program.
To facilitate open debate and critical argument on this important
subject, Air Power Australia
has decided to make this assessment public, in the hope that all senior
acquisition personnel across all participating nations can benefit in
the same manner as their peers in Canberra have. The following is an
extract from a recent communication by Peter Goon, Co-founder of Air
Power Australia. |
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Extract
from Advice to Defence Materiel
Organisation, Canberra, 19th
November, 2009
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.
.
.
As you pointed out in a recent eMail, there has been considerable and
significant correspondence and other communications in relation
to the deep concerns held by many about the JSF Program.
Ponder if you
will why so many people, from such diverse backgrounds and with such a
body of
knowledge on Military and Industry matters, have given so much of their
valuable time to communicate such a consistent message to you and
others in
Defence and the Government.
Now, consider
this:
- If the
consistent message that all
these people are telling you proves to be incorrect, then there will be
nil
effect on the National Interest, just some bruised reputations.
- However, if the JSF Program
claims
that you and others in Defence/DMO have been conveying to the
Government and
the People of Australia are incorrect, then there are extreme levels of
risks
to the sovereignty of Australia; there will be serious ramifications in
terms
of safety, performance, supportability, reputation, schedule and
cost for
the whole of the Australian Defence Forces and the Australian
population at
large; and, consequently, history will most likely not be kind to those
responsible.
As you know, independent analyses of the data and the
facts and testing of the evidence from the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
Program,
as well as deep analyses in the areas of Defence Management,
Decay
of Critical Thinking
in Defence and related traits such as 'Groupthink', 'framing' and the
behaviour
known as 'a
total
indifference
to
reality', have been done.
All, for some time, have been showing the latter (No 2)
scenario is the most likely outcome.
In order to provide clarity to what appears to be a
somewhat complex and, thus, confusing situation, the following Risk
Assessment
has been produced. As you can see, this has been done in
accordance with
the instructions and measures contained in the recently approved Defence/DMO
Liability
Risk
Management
Process. The purpose is to assist
you in
assisting the Government in its aim of ensuring and assuring a new air
combat
capability (NACC) outcome of "what is right and what is best" will
be achieved, in the National Interest.
This Risk Assessment is based upon data and facts
available within Defence and Industry since 2004 as well as those
provided to
Mr Neil Orme's 2008 Air Combat Capability Review.
Notice there are no yellow or green traffic lights in the
assessment. Also, even if the likelihood (i.e. probability) of
any of the
identified risks materialising was MODERATE/POSSIBLE (i.e. in the
Yellow),
based upon the 'vector quantity' of risk and relationship between
risk and time, the level of assessed risk would still be EXTREME.
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Joint
Strike
Fighter
(JSF)
Mantra KPP |
Identified
Risk |
Probability
of
Risk Arising |
Outcome
if Risk Arises
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Assessed
Level
of
Risk |
Comments |
| Claim
the
JSF
is
a Fifth Generation Fighter |
JSF
is
not
a
Fifth Generation Fighter |
P = 1.0
Reality |
Numerous & Severe including:
Uncompetitive
SEC Anti-Trust Action/s
ASIC/ACCC TPA Action/s
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Real,
Present and Extreme Issue/
Problem |
No
longer
a
Risk
but a real Issue/Problem.
For proof, see:
Mr Secretary
- Why Does the Pentagon Say the JSF is a 5th Generation Fighter .
. Really? |
| Affordable |
Not
Affordable
in Numbers Needed |
Almost
Certain |
Severe
>50% increase
in costs
>5 year delay
+ BACC Costs
(>$6.6 Bn)
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Extreme |
Already
over
Defence/
DMO
SEVERE
consequence
rating which states >10% increase in
cost and >12 months delay as SEVERE outcomes. |
| Survivable |
Not
Survivable Against
Reference Threats |
Likely
(1) |
Severe
Loss of Air Superiority |
Extreme |
For
Reference
Threats,
see
relevant papers and analyses via the linked
buttons below.
Loss of access to and control of Air/Sea/Land Gap
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| Lethal |
Less
Lethal
than
Reference
Threats |
Likely
(1) |
Severe
Loss of Air Superiority |
Extreme |
For
Reference
Threats,
see
relevant papers and analyses via the linked
buttons below.
Loss of access to and control of Air/Sea/Land Gap
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| Supportable |
High
Dependence
on
Foreign OEM
(International Conglomerate) |
Almost
Certain |
Major
Loss of
Sovereign Control/
Deskilling Australia |
Extreme |
Origins
of
risk
lie
in the Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) and
similar contracting models adopted by the DMO earlier this decade.
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(1)
A conservative estimate based upon JSF
Program claims of ability to defeat Su-27SK fighters and
S-300V/PMU1/PMU2 SAM systems. Independent analyses yield an
'Almost Certain' likelihood.
Legend for Assessed Level of Risk (in keeping
with AS/NZS4360:2004 and ISO31000):
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E-
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Extreme level of risk (Immediate action
required by Executive and Directing Governance levels, i.e. do not
proceed with activity until this level of risk is reduced)
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H-
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High level of risk (Executive Management
attention required)
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M-
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Moderate level of risk (Able to delegate to
Implementation Management Level with ongoing Executive Management
oversight)
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L-
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Low level of risk (Able to be managed through
routine procedures)
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In
drafting this
and looking at the Risk Assessment Table, attached, it became obvious
this
project is also suffering from what Mr Charles Haddon-Cave QC cited as
the 'Normalisation
of Deviance' in his report 'The
Nimrod
Review' - an
independent review into the all pervasive and extant issues surrounding
the
loss of the RAF
Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006.
This is
a recently released and appropriately scathing report (very
professionally
done) on the UK Ministry of Defence and some of its principal
contractors. In this report he names
those
responsible and says why.
The
costs/schedule of the JSF Program have already exceeded what would be
considered standard risk assessment metrics for CATASTROPHIC (or, in
DMO/Defence
risk parlance - SEVERE) let alone MAJOR consequences, by significant
degrees. Also, a glance at the below list which are the uncanny,
yet
disturbing, parallels Mr Haddon-Cave determined with other
accidents/incidents
like Columbia, Challenger, et al., shows as self evident that others in
this
list equally apply to the JSF Program e.g. 'Dilution of risk management
processes', 'Power Point engineering', Imposition of 'business'
principles, etc.
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LSN
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Influences/Attitudes/Behaviours
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Are these traits of the JSF Program and/or
Australian NACC Project?
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(1)
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The 'can do' attitude and 'perfect place'
culture.
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Yes/Yes
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(2)
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Torrent of changes and organisational turmoil.
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Yes/Yes
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(3)
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Imposition of 'business' principles.
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Yes/Yes
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(4)
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Cuts in resources and manpower - deskilling.
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Yes/Yes
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(5)
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Dangers of outsourcing to contractors.
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Yes/Yes
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(6)
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Dilution of risk management processes.
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Yes/Yes
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(7)
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Dysfunctional databases.
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Yes/Yes
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(8)
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'PowerPoint engineering'.
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Yes/Yes
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(9)
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Uncertainties as to Out-of-Service
(In-Service) date.
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Yes/Yes
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(10)
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'Normalisation of deviance'.
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Yes/Yes
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(11)
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'Success-engendered optimism'.
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Yes/Yes
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(12)
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'The few, the tired'.
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Yes/Yes
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The $64
billion dollar question should now be self evident - What needs to be
done
to prevent this 'perfect storm'?
What
remains
is for this assessment to be formally presented to the Minister for
Defence,
the Hon John Faulkner, and the Minister for Defence Procurement, the
Hon Greg
Combet, prior to any decision by the Government on continued
involvement with
the JSF Program.
As our
Ministerially appointed senior contact in Defence, can I rely upon you
to do
this, on our behalf and that of other concerned private citizens of
Australia?
When
doing
so, if there are any countervailing views that accompany this
assessment, in
the interests of completeness and good governance, could you please
provide us
with copies of these, in keeping with standard governance and critical
thinking
protocols.
If you
have
any questions or disagreements concerning the above or the various
requests
contained herein, please don't hesitate to contact me directly.
Cordially,
Peter Goon
Peter Goon
Principal
Consultant/Advisor
Head of Test and
Evaluation
Co-Founder, Air Power Australia
Peter Goon and
Associates
Mob:
+61 (0)41 980
6476
Thursday,
19
November
2009
"Scientists discover the world that exists;
Engineers create the world that never was."
Theodore Von Karman, Aerospace
Engineer
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Air
Power
Australia
Website - http://www.ausairpower.net/
Air Power Australia Research and
Analysis - http://www.ausairpower.net/research.html
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