|
| Last
Updated: Sun Aug 29 16:43:38 UTC 2010
|
APA NOTAMS ISSN 1836-7135
Reassessing Iran's Air Defences
|
|
Air Power
Australia - Australia's Independent Defence Think Tank
|
Air Power Australia NOTAM
17th
July,
2010
|
Dr Carlo Kopp,
SMAIAA, MIEEE, PEng,
Head of Capability Analysis, Air Power Australia
|
| Contacts: |
Carlo
Kopp
|
|
|
|
Mob:
0437-478-224
|
|
|
|
Iran
recently
paraded
a Russian built Nebo SVU “counter-stealth” radar
system.
Depicted is an NNIIRT 1L119 Nebo SVU VHF-band AESA radar demonstrator
towed by a Ural 4320 6 x 6 tractor on display in deployed configuration
(Image © Miroslav Gyűrösi).
|
Ongoing disagreements between
the Western alliance and Iran over that nation's illicit nuclear
materials program have fuelled considerable speculation in recent weeks
over the possibility of Israeli or US led air strikes against Iran's
nuclear industrial base. Should this outcome arise, attacking aircraft
will have to overcome a disparate but rapidly modernising Integrated
Air Defence System (IADS).
Performing accurate assessments of Iran's military capabilities is
always challenging, as Iran is a closed society run by an
Islamo-fascist regime, itself dominated by a theocratic leadership, and
its military arm, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This
arrangement is in many key respects modelled on the 1940s Nazi state,
where the regime maintained its own “private” military force (the
Waffen SS) to make military coups against the regime difficult, if not
impossible.
Air Power Australia has published two assessments of Iran's air defence
system since 2007, one exploring the technology used in Iran's IADS,
the other the deployment of strategic SAM systems and their achievable
coverage. Neither assessment has credited Iran with an effective
capability, and for good reasons, as much of Iran's inventory of radar
equipment and SAMs qualifies as obsolete by contemporary standards [1],
[2].
Three SAM types provide primary area defence coverage:
- The Russian supplied Almaz S-200VE Vega / SA-5B Gammon long
range SAM, with a range of up to 200 nautical miles against high flying
targets;
- The Chinese supplied HQ-2 “Sayyad” / CSA-1 or 2 Guideline
medium range SAM, with a range of around 30 nautical miles;
- The US supplied Raytheon MIM-23 Hawk tactical SAM, kept
operational and modified since the fall of the Shah in 1979, with a
range of around 15 nautical miles.
Claims have emerged that Iran has reverse engineered the Hawk and is
manufacturing components or systems. Similar claims have also emerged
around the Chinese supplied SA-2 Guideline. Reports of unspecified
upgrades to the Russian supplied SA-5 Gammons also exist. No good open
source validation has emerged as yet for any of these claims, as a
result of which assessments are limited to close in and overhead image
interpretation, which cannot usually help in assessing improvements to
guidance and internal electronic components, such as missile seekers
and datalinks.
A wide range of possibilities exists, in terms of technology upgrades
available for the S-200VE Vega / SA-5B Gammon, the HQ-2 “Sayyad” /
CSA-1/2 Guideline, and sufficient basic technology exists in the global
market to effect numerous upgrades to the MIM-23B Hawk. While the
latter would involve considerable indigenous engineering effort, as
suggested by Iranian media claims around the “Mersad” system, upgrades
to the original Soviet SAM systems and supporting radars are widely
available, with offerings from Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine, Serbia and
other nations now available in the market.
The basic S-200VE Vega / SA-5B Gammon and HQ-2 “Sayyad” / CSA-1/2
Guideline have been wholly compromised since the end of the Cold War,
as a result of which highly effective electronic countermeasures
techniques exist against the radar equipment employed in both. The
original analogue SNR/RSNA-75 Fan Song, SJ-202 Gin Sling and 5N62
Square Pair cannot compete against contemporary Digital RF Memory
(DRFM) jammer technology, whether used in self protection systems, or
support jamming systems.
The same is not necessarily true of any digital rebuilds which may have
been applied to the engagement radars and in the instance of the CWSARH
S-200VE Vega / SA-5B Gammon and “Mersad”, also the missile terminal
seekers. Upgrades produced in Belarus for instance incorporate fully
digital signal and data processing, modern ECCM features, and jam
resistant frequency hopping waveforms, as well as non-coherent emitting
decoys [3].
Another possibility, for which no evidence exists to date, is that of
hybridisation of these legacy SAMs, using foreign supplied engagement
radars, such as the Chinese H-200 space feed PESA.
Given the absence of public disclosure policy in most potential
suppliers of such upgrades, covert intelligence collection may be the
only way to determine if the claimed upgrades are real or no more than
artefacts of Iran's very active propaganda machine.
Iranian 5Yu24M transporter/transloader carrying an
S-200VE/SA-5 Gammon 5V28 round. The Kraz-260 is replaced by an imported
Italian built Iveco 6 x 4 tractor.
Early model 1D / SA-2A Guideline on an SM-63 launcher. Iran's Chinese
built HQ-2s are largely based on this variant (Image
© Miroslav
Gyűrösi).
MIM-23B Hawk /
Mersad
|
 |
|
Iran's Mersad SAM system appears to
be a reverse engineered derivative of the MIM-23B Hawk which was the
principal SAM operated by Iran before the fall of the Shah, Reza
Pahlavi. The system appears to use a largely new
package of radar equipment, although the TV tracker equipped CW
illuminator resembles the original X-band
AN/MPQ-46 HPIR design (left). The acquisition
radar also closely resembles the AN/MPQ-50 PAR design (below). Details
of other
system components have not been disclosed to date.
|
 |
 |
Most of the recent media coverage surrounding Iran's SAM capabilities
has centred on the long delayed delivery of a several batteries of
Russian built Almaz S-300PMU1 / SA-20A Gargoyle SAM systems. This SAM
system is the export configuration of the late Soviet era S-300PM, the
first “digital” variant of the S-300P series, but lacking the longer
ranging radars, missiles and more sophisticated battery networking of
the later S-300PMU2 Favorit exported in large numbers to China.
Nevertheless, the S-300PMU1 is a formidable SAM system, comparable to
earlier variants of the Raytheon MIM-104 Patriot, but with much better
mobility and thus survivability under air attack. To date no Western
air force has fought against the S-300P series SAM system [4].
On the 9th June, 2010, the UN Security council voted to upgrade the
sanctions regime against Tehran, as a result of which the Russians are
now unlikely to proceed with the delivery of these systems to Iran.
Official statements by the Russians since then have been interpreted
and re-interpreted in the Western, Russian, Israeli and Iranian media.
Israeli sources have cited the Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Andrei Denisov, as claiming “Moscow believes that the
sanctions resolution clearly forbids the sale of the S-300 system to
Iran”.
Since late June, Iranian media have been actively denouncing Russia's
reluctance to complete the deal, with claims that Russia had already
been paid for the SAMs. In late June, Iran's Defense Minister Ahmad
Vahidi was quoted in the Tehran Times, claiming that Iran would
manufacture its own long range SAM systems - a claim not unlike Iran's
public declaration during the 1980s, that it would design and build its
own replacement for US supplied Grumman F-14A Tomcat fighters.
Earlier claims had emerged that Iran would procure the very similar,
but newer in electronic hardware design, Chinese built HQ-9 SAM system.
To date no evidence has emerged that the Chinese have been receptive to
this idea – China has been very actively marketing the HQ-9
internationally, since last year, but would confront serious
international political challenges in exporting this system to Iran.
From an analytical perspective, much more interesting than the
S-300PMU1 media
controversy has been the emergence of Iranian sourced imagery over the
last six months, depicting radar and SAM systems, but without any
supporting official explanations.
Iranian containerised VHF-band acquisition radar,
likely based on a Spoon Rest variant of Soviet or Chinese origin (FARS).
The first of these was an image posted on the official FARS newsagency
website,
showing a partly stowed VHF band radar installation, built into an ISO
style shipping container on a semi-trailer. The semi-trailer is towed
by an imported EU built IVECO AT720 6 x 4 tractor, ostensibly sold to
Iran for civilian use.
The radar appears to be a derivative of either a Russian or Chinese
P-12/18 Spoon Rest subtype, but there are sufficient differences in the
configuration of the Yagi array elements to safely state that this
design is more than a repackaged Soviet “classic” or Chinese
re-engineered clone.
It is not clear whether this is a demonstrator, preproduction
prototype, or production item. In comparison with legacy Spoon Rest
variants, this configuration would permit much faster deployment and
stowing in an operational environment, as there is no need to align two
trucks and couple them with cable harnesses. How much faster is not
entirely clear – the antenna appears to stow in parts on the roof of
the container.
Of much more strategic concern was a released image showing a stowed
original
Russian built NNIIRT 1L119 Nebo SVU “counter-stealth” VHF-band AESA
acquisition radar, displayed publicly during the 18th April, 2010,
“Army Day” parade [5].
Iranian VHF-band 1L119 Nebo SVU
AESA acquisition radar on parade (www.military.ir).
To date the production and export status of the 1L119 Nebo SVU VHF-band
AESA has remained unknown, as the Russians have made no public
disclosures.
This fully solid state design is the most advanced VHF
band radar ever produced, using AESA capability for electronic
beamsteering, likely monopulse angle tracking, and incorporating Space
Time Adaptive Processing (STAP) technology for digital clutter and
chaff rejection. The example photographed appeared largely identical to
display examples shown at Russian arms shows, but includes a quad-Yagi
V-pol backlobe cancelling array, never seen before on Russian examples.
Unusually, the tractor appears to be an obsolete KrAZ-255, rather than
the much newer and more powerful Ural 4320 series seen with Russian
examples. Other differences include an antenna shroud which closely
resembles that used with the legacy NNIIRT 1L13 Nebo SV / Box Spring
radar – the element count on the Iranian radar clearly shows it is
the later 1L119 Nebo SVU AESA, not the conventional 1980s technology
1L13 Nebo SV.
Whether the Nebo SVU is used as a SAM battery acquisition radar, or an
area search radar, this represents a “step function” leap in capability
for Iran, as this is a modern fully digital radar which has most of the
technological refinements in its Western peers, substantial resistance
to jamming, and electronic beamsteering for high update rate sector
scans and multiple target “track-while-scan” capabilities. In many
respects the AESA capability of the Nebo SVU qualifies as “Aegis-like”.
Jamming modes in the legacy US built ALQ-99 low band jammer
pods, developed to
defeat legacy analogue Soviet VHF-band threats, may not be entirely
effective against a Nebo SVU, given its modern digital design and
likely capability to dynamically place mainlobe nulls onto a jamming
emitter.
The number of Nebo SVU systems procured by Iran remains unknown,
just as their operational status remains unclear.
No less interesting imagery emerged earlier this year on an Iranian
military enthusiast website, showing what was described as an “Iranian
S-300 SAM system”, also displayed publicly during the 18th April,
2010,
“Army Day” parade. This was claimed to be an “S-300PMU1” system. These
images showed what appears to be a stowed 30N6E series Tomb Stone space
feed
PESA engagement radar, and what appears to be a
derivative of the earlier self
propelled 5P85S TEL used with the later S-300P subtypes.
The “Iranian
S-300 SAM system” displayed at the Army Day parade has been dismissed
by many analysts as a fake or mockup, produced to effectively emulate
the famous 1960s Soviet OKB-1 8K713/GR-1 / SS-10 SCRAG FOBS
deception [6].
This system is thus worth closer scrutiny. Possible explanations for
the indigenous “Iranian
S-300 SAM system” include:
- The displayed system is a non-functional mockup / decoy
constructed using non-operational components sourced from Russian or
other former-Soviet republics, with the intent to produce strategic
deception and convince the West that Iran has this capability;
- The displayed system is a non-functional mockup / decoy
constructed using documentation and/or imagery sourced from Russian or
other
former-Soviet republics, with the intent to produce strategic deception
and convince the West that Iran has this capability;
- The displayed system may be a one-off prototype of the
configuration intended for the production S-300PMU1 delivery, and
supplied to Iran for operational testing and specification compliance
checks;
- The displayed system is a fully operational rehosted SA-10B
or SA-20A constructed using refurbished operational SA-10B or SA-20A
components sourced from former-Soviet republics other than Russia, with
the intent to hedge against delays in or the collapse of the publicly
disclosed S-300PMU1 purchase.
Testing these possibilities against the available evidence does not
make a compelling case that the “Iranian
S-300 SAM system” is more than replay of the FOBS strategy, and may
well be aimed at a domestic rather than a foreign audience.
Iranian “30N6” radar on parade
(www.military.ir).
Almaz 30N6E2 Tomb Stone A deployed.
Note the distinct array shape (image © Said Aminov, Vestnik-PVO).
The engagement radar displayed resembles the original
Russian built 30N6E1 Tomb Stone S-300PMU1 / SA-20A Gargoyle engagement
radar system,
but rehosted on an Iranian 8 x 8 all terrain vehicle very different
from
the
Belarus sourced MAZ-543 / MZKT-7930 series used exclusively with
original Russian sourced S-300PM/PMU/PMU1/PMU2 systems. Iranian sources
claim the designation “Bakr”, and cite the use of this design as a
tractor for towing a tank transporter trailer.
The stowed telescoping antenna system for the TEL datalink
is similar but not
identical to the design typically seen on Russian 30N6 installations.
What appears identical to late model Russian built S-300PMU2 systems is
what
appears as the
installation of the highly precise Russian built NK Orientir radio /
satellite navigation and alignment system, visible on the roof
of the 8 x 8 truck cabin. This system has not been reported as yet
installed on Russian operated S-300PM systems.
As the 30N6 antenna is stowed, it is not possible to determine whether
the radar is a 30N6-1, 30N6E, 30N6E1 or 30N6E2, as the distinguishing
detail is hidden from visual observation. The mounts for the hydraulic
rams used to elevate the antenna, the hinges and other features most
closely resemble the later 30N6E1/E2 radars. Other details like cabin
doors, camouflage net tie-down points, antenna feed/lens shroud and
hydraulic ram designs are similar but not identical to the Russian
originals.
If this is a replica or mockup, it is a
very well constructed one, since nearly all of the fine detail is
present, and
differences observed would not be inconsistent with rehosting to a new
carrier vehicle, and repackaging the antenna head into a new turret.
Why a designer might do the latter is not clear, given that it incurs
considerable expense for no obvious benefit.
If the system is intended as a deception, it is not clear why
indigenous Iranian 8 x 8 vehicles were employed, rather than abundant
and easily acquired pre-loved MAZ-543 chassis, numerous examples
of which have been sold in Western nations as host vehicles for
drilling rigs. Replica TELs and radars carried on original Belarus
built MAZ-543 chassis would be extremely difficult to differentiate
from original S-300PMU1 components.
Iranian “5P85S” TEL on parade
(FARS, www.military.ir).
Russian
S-300PMU 5P85SU TEL being reloaded by a 22T6E transloader (via
valka.cz).
The self propelled “5P85S” TELs on display share the common 8 x 8
chassis,
and like the 30N6 displayed, show some original Russian features, but
also
unique features.
The missile container / launch tube shaping appears to be the
same as original
Russian
hardware, as there are no visible differences from the design used on
original mid to late production systems armed with the 48N6 series
missile round. Chinese HQ-9 tubes have different reinforcement ring
arrangements.
The hydraulically elevated gantry for the tubes does not
appear identical to the Russian 5P85S design, nor does the equipment
cabin on the TEL. Neither image shows evidence of the TEL datalink mast
and antenna, which clearly protrudes above the profile of all known
Russian variants. The lends credence to assessments of these TELs as
mockups.
The imagery of this SAM system raises more good questions
than answers.
Given repeated Russian claims that the S-300PMU1 had not been supplied
to Iran, and Iran's public complaints and threats made to the Russians
over the suspended delivery, there is not a compelling case that this
system is a portion of the suspended multiple battery procurement. The
Russians have never before rehosted the S-300P series on customer
supplied vehicles, policy always being to use proven high production
volume Belarus or Russian built vehicles, the quirks of which are well
known and understood.
US sources have assessed the “Iranian
S-300 SAM system” to be a fake intended for propaganda purposes.
While the ground truth behind this SAM system, or as
Occam's Razor would suggest fake SAM
system, may take some time to reveal
itself, what is clear from the acquisition of the potent Nebo SVU, the
considerable investment in re-engineering the MIM-23B Hawk, and
the protracted fracas over the Russian supply of the S-300PMU1, is that
Iran has been highly active in attempting
to improve its IADS capabilities.
If Israeli or US led air forces are called upon to fly against Iran in
the nearer future, we should not be surprised if there are some nasty
and “surprising” capability surprises in the Iranian IADS.
|
|
Notes:
1 Please refer http://www.ausairpower.net/DT-Iran-Analysis-2007.pdf
2 Please refer http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Iran-SAM-Deployment.html
3 Please refer http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Legacy-SAM-Upgrades.html
4 Please
refer http://www.ausairpower.net/FM-44-85-Patriot-Battalion-and-Battery-Operations.pdf
5 Please refer http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Nebo-SVU-Analysis.html
6 Please refer http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Sov-FOBS-Program.html
7 Further details on the S-300PMU1, S-200VE, HQ-2 can be
located at: http://www.ausairpower.net/sams-iads.html.
8 Iranian imagery reproduced in
accordance with 17 U.S.C. §107, this material is distributed for
non-profit research and educational purposes only.
|
© 2010, Carlo Kopp
|
 |
Air
Power Australia Website - http://www.ausairpower.net/
Air Power Australia Research and
Analysis - http://www.ausairpower.net/research.html
|
|
|
![Australia's First Online Journal Covering Air Power Issues [ISSN 1832-2433]](apa-analyses.png "Australia's First Online Journal Covering Air Power Issues [ISSN 1832-2433]")
