Second Artillery DF-21C terminally guided IRBM carried by high mobility WS-2400 TEL.

S-300PMU2 Favorit / SA-20B Gargoyle ABM Components

The large self-propelled NIIIP 64N6E2 Big Bird battle management radar is a space fed transmissive phased array. In ABM acquisition mode, the antenna is mechanically pointed in the direction of the incoming ballistic missile, mechanically tilted back, and the S-band pencil beam is electronically steered through the search volume (© 2009 Said Aminov, Vestnik-PVO).

The Fakel 48N6E2 Gargoyle SAM/ABM is guided by the Almaz-Antey 30N6E2 Tomb Stone phased array monopulse engagement radar, using a Track Via Missile scheme (© 2009 Said Aminov, Vestnik-PVO).

A Chinese ballistic missile defence system will be linked to the Second Artillery Corps' numerous ASAT sensor sites, providing tracking and targeting data for engagement of satellites and incoming warheads.  There are eight satellite ground tracking stations, along with the space and satellite launch facilities at Taiyuan, Wuzhai and Jinquan, supplemented by four maritime tracking and control ships and two external ground stations in Kiribati and Namibia.⁴ To this must be included the PLA’s early warning and tracking radars which form part of the HQ-9 and S-300P series SAM systems.   

Intercepting an incoming warhead in a test is not an unusually difficult achievement if you have missiles capable of entering the upper atmosphere and good tracking radars. The Nike-Zeus system intercepted 10 out of 14 warheads in 1962, although this was with nuclear warheads.⁵ The first successful non-nuclear intercept of a dummy Minuteman ICBM warhead in flight was on 10 June 1984 by an infra-red guided Kinetic Kill Vehicle (KKV), which unfurled a 4.2 metre metal net containing 36 spines.⁶  



The intended production LIM-49A Spartan exoatmospheric ABM was a direct evolution of the Nike-Zeus ABM demonstrator (US Army).

The Chinese anti-satellite system was described by the Director of the United States Defense Intelligence Agency as a SE-19 KKV launched by a modified road mobile DF-21, or its civilian derivative the KT-1, from a Chinese manufactured WS-2400 Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL).  Being road mobile means the launcher, along with communications and maintenance vehicles, could be deployed on the best axis to intercept a satellite, and making the ASAT system virtually impossible to target before launch.  PLA forces deployed in another country could bring along an ASAT as part of their corps level assets to destroy foreign  reconnaissance satellites looking at their forces, even if these forces  were deployed well outside Chinese territory.  

The anti-ballistic missile was most likely to have also been launched using a DF-21/KT-1 booster, although a mature system would benefit from a higher velocity launch vehicle, given that in real life incoming warheads will be detected in far less time than during a test range trial. 

The announcement that the PLA intercepted a missile in the midcourse phase of its flight was not unexpected, given its ability to intercept a satellite in space.  This does not mean that China has a workable operational ABM system, but all the pieces are now in place if it chose to develop such a system to protect itself from an Indian intermediate range ballistic missile. The intriguing question is why the Politburo continues to reveal China’s new strategic capabilities, reducing the powerful weapon of surprise whilst strengthening the position of the hawks in Washington, New Delhi and Taipei.  It also warns India of the strategic need to include decoys and employ other measures to reduce vulnerability of its missiles.

1. Refer ‘Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise, Volume I: Main Report’, September 2009, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, D.C., http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports.htm; for a  discussion of other recent instances of such capability surprises, please refer May-June 2009 APA Briefs at: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Briefings.html and NOTAMs http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-111109-1.html and http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-NOTAM-061209-1.html.

2. Mikhail Timofeyev.  "Favorit": shooting in the Celestial’, http://www.vko.ru/DesktopModules/ Articles/ArticlesView.aspx?tabID=320&ItemID=280&mid=2891&wversion=Staging, accessed 13 January 2010.

3. Performance figures for the S-300 series are from taken from ‘S300VM (Antey-2500)’, S-300PMU-1 Air Defence Systems and Favorit Long Range Air Defence System’ in ‘Air Defence Systems’, Rosobornexport Catalogue, Rosonboronexport, Moscow, 2003, pp, 10-13.

4. ‘China’s Space Facilities’, Global Security.Org, http://globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/facility.htm accessed 21 February 2009.

5. Papp, D.S.  ‘From Project Thumper to SDI: The Role of Ballistic Missile Defense in US Security Policy’, Airpower Journal, Volume One, Number Three, pp. 35 - 51.

6. Payne, K.P.  Strategic Defense “Star Wars” in Perspective, Hamilton Press, Lanham, 1986.

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