With the recent public exposure
of the PLA's Xian H-6K turbofan powered
Badger cruise missile carrier it
is clear that the PLA is moving ahead with its planning for a strategic
bomber fleet with more reach than the legacy H-6 Badger variants, under
the auspices of the "Second
Island Chain Strategy". Off
the shelf candidates for this fleet include upgraded surplus Russian
Air Force Tu-22M3 Backfire C and Tu-95MS Bear H aircraft, and new build
Tu-160 Blackjacks, as well as the indigenous and smaller H-6K. In 2005
the Chief of Air Staff of the Russian Air
Force observed, in relation to the Backfire and Bear, that surplus
aircraft should be exported to China.
In terms of time to deployment and acquisition cost, the
Backfire is strong contender in any competitive flyoff between
these types. To best
appreciate the potential strategic impact of the
Backfire upon this region APA will explore the
capabilities and further growth potential of the aircraft in more
detail.
The underpowered Tu-22M2 Backfire B was
the first production model, or
which over 200 were built (US DoD).

The Tupolev Tu-22M3
Backfire C
The latest variant of the Backfire is the third generation
Tu-22M3 Backfire C model, which remained in production until 1993.
The earliest origins of the Backfire were in the earlier Tu-22
Blinder, a Russian analogue to the US B-58 Hustler. Inferior to the
B-58, the Soviet air staff sought a significantly more capable design.
After much research and internal argument during the mid 1960s, the
Tu-22M designation was allocated to a largely unique design.
The first Backfire variant was the Tu-22M-0 subtype, using an
F-4 Phantom like inlet arrangement, long inlet tunnels, a variable
geometry wing, and B-1A-like side by side seating, unlike the tandem
Tu-22 Blinder. A pair of NK-144-22 afterburning fans, common to the
Tu-144 Concord-ski were employed. The embryonic Backfire inherited
the single centreline Raduga Kh-22/AS-4 Kitchen [More
...]
supersonic standoff missile as
its primary weapon. Flight testing progressed concurrently with low
rate initial production, but only 10 were built by late 1972.
Dissatisfaction with the baseline Backfire led to an extensive
rework of the design, under the designation Tu-22M-1 or Backfire A.
Aerodynamics were refined, 6,500 lb of weight removed, span was
increased by 60 inches and the speedbrake was relocated. The Backfire A
was also a disappointment, and only 9 were built by late 1972.
Yet another cycle of redesign work followed, producing the
Tu-22M-2 or Backfire B designated article 45-02, the first mass
production variant. It was around 3,000 lb lighter than the Backfire A,
and powered by a pair of new NK-22 engines. With more thrust, the
Backfire B could lift up to 24 tonnes of weapons, including a payload
of three Kh-22/AS-4 Kitchen missiles. The aircraft carried a tail
turret with paired NR-23 guns, a PRS-3 Argon-2 ranging radar and TV
remote gunsight. The PNA-B Rubin / Down Beat attack radar was designed
to provide over 300 degree coverage emulating the HP Victor
installation, and was supplemented by a ventral remote TV bombsight
arranged like that in the Avro Vulcan. Dal'naya Aviatsia IOC was
achieved in 1974, with AV-MF naval aviation regiments receiving their
Backfire Bs in 1976. By the end of production in 1983, no less than 211
examples were built.

Tupolev
Tu-22M3 Backfire C.

The underpowered Backfire B was considered inadequate and
design work commenced early on the improved Tu-22M3 or Backfire C
designated Article 45-03, which first flew in 1977, following trials of
the more powerful NK-25 engine in a Backfire B airframe. The redesign
was extensive, including some use of titanium structure to further
reduce empty weight, and was led by the Tupolev Bureau's Deputy Chief
Designer Boris E Levanovich. The most visible change were the adoption
of F-15 style ramped inlets, and revised auxiliary inlets. Less visible
were changes to the wing design, permitting a 65 degree sweep, more
than earlier variants. The reshaped and stretched nose incorporated a
revised refuelling probe design. Further changes were made to the
vertical tail, undercarriage, defensive gun package and avionics.
During the mid-1990s the author discussed the Tu-22M3 with Levanovich,
who was adamant that the production aircraft had a hi-hi-hi combat
radius of 4,000 km (2,160 NMI) with a payload of three Kh-22M/AS-4
missiles, well in excess of then current Western estimates.
Emitter array
for internal
SPS-171/172 electronically
steerable jammer, depicted in podded configuration (KNIRTI).

Detector
aperture for the L-082 MAK-UL
series infrared MAWS, here installed on a Bear H (Azovsky OKB).

Terminal hard
kill defensive capability in the aft sector is provided by a UKU-9A-802
tail barbette, fitted with a single GSh-23 gun, and directed by
an
improved PRS-4KM Kripton / Box Tail ranging radar and remote TV camera.
Avionic improvements were no less extensive. The Avtomat 3
Radar Warning Receiver was fitted, with an internal variant of the
KNIRTI SPS-171/172 Sorbstiya wideband phased array jammer (refer image)
and the AG-56 automated nosie generator also carried. The SPS-171/172
is claimed to provide noise and
deception jamming modes, and is available podded as the L-005 for the
Su-27/30. The
UKU-9A-802 tail barbette was fitted with a single GSh-23 gun, supported
by an
improved PRS-4KM Kripton / Box Tail ranging radar and remote TV camera.
Ventral and dorsal infrared L-082 MAK-UL series Missile Approach
Warning System
(MAWS) turrets are fitted to many aircraft.

The ventral OBP-15T remote TV
bombsight is used to target dumb
bombs. The fairing for this device is well placed to fit an infrared
imaging laser
targeting system (RuAF).
The earlier PNA-B attack radar was
replaced with an improved Leninets PNA-D, which includes Doppler beam
sharpening and terrain avoidance modes for low level penetration, there
are no reports of the Sopka Terrain Following Radar (TFR) used in the
Tu-160
fitted to Backfires. The SMKRITs (RORSAT Targeting Datalink
Receiver) is fitted, using a Molniya satcom link. The Groza
OBP-15T TV remote optical bombsight
common to the Tu-160 was used.

The centreline Kh-22 store is
carried semi-conformally, with
sculpted bomb bay doors to accommodate the weapon. The bomb bay rotary
launcher is otherwise used for a range of weapons (US DoD).

Outboard glove station
BD-45K/F
adaptors are used to carry a
pair of external Kh-22 rounds, but can be replaced with bomb racks for
up to 3 tonnes of free fall bombs. (via Wikipedia).




The weapons suite for the Backfire C reflects its late Cold
War Soviet tasking. The primary weapon for AV-MF naval Backfires were
anti-shipping, anti-radiation and nuclear variants of the very
formidable Raduga
Kh-22 Burya / AS-4 Kitchen [More ...].
Anti-radiation and nuclear variants were also
carried by Dal'naya Aviatsia Backfire C aircraft as defence suppression
weapons. The Backfire bomb bay can be fitted with doors which have
contoured recesses to fit a centreline conformal Kh-22 round on a
BD-45F adaptor. Two
external rounds can be carried on BD-45K adaptors, mounted on the
outboard glove hardpoints.

The Kh-15 /
AS-16 Kickback is the Russian equivalent to SAC's AGM-69 SRAM. Note the
maritime strike CONOPS using offboard targeting provided by the
Tu-95RTs Bear D Uspekh / Big Bulge X-band surveillance and targeting
radar (via Warfare.ru).

The bomb bay can also be fitted with an MKU series rotary
launcher for six
Kh-15 / AS-16 Kickback nuclear or conventional armed defence
suppression missiles, a Soviet
analogue to the US AGM-69A SRAM carried by the FB-111A and B-52H. Four
additional rounds can be carried
on the outboard glove stations, and inboard ventral inlet tunnel
stations, for a total of 10 weapons.
Like US heavy bombers in the era predating precision bombs,
the Backfire C can also carry a large payload of dumb bombs. External
beam ejector racks can be fitted to the outboard glove stations and
inboard ventral inlet tunnel stations, each carrying 9 x FAB-250 500 lb
dumb bombs, which including the 24 round bomb bay stations permits
carriage of up to 69 FAB-250 rounds, more than the Mk.82 payload of the
B-52H. The external stations can also be used to carry paired FAB-1500
3,000 lb dumb bombs, for a total of 8 rounds. The maximum weapons
payload is usually cited at 24 tonnes.
In terms of performance the Backfire C is best described as a
124 tonne 'oversized F-111', carrying around 120,000 lb of internal
fuel, with Mach 2 class dash speed and a combat radius between 2,000
and 2,500 nautical miles, subject to weapon payload and profile.
Eastern European sources claim that low level penetration profiles can
be flown, in addition to the 'classical' high altitude supersonic
profile. Tupolev data indicates that the aircraft is compatible with
any runway capable of supporting a later 767 variant.
The Tu-22M3 remained in production until 1993, and various
sources claim that up to 268 units were built. As IOC was achieved in
1989 and operational flying rapidly curtailed after 1991, the average
number of fatigue hours accumulated by the Backfire C fleet is very
low, especially for the last aircraft built, which have a calendar age
of only 14 years. US sources currently put Russian Air Force inventory
numbers at 105, Russian Naval Aviation numbers at 105, and Ukrainian
Air Force numbers at 14 (with 16 Backfire B).
| Designation |
|
Type
|
|
|
|
| TA-6 |
|
APU |
| TACh-1V |
|
Automatic
Fuel Balance Management System |
| NK-45 |
|
Navigation
System |
| ABSU-145M |
|
Autopilot |
| RV-5 |
|
Low
Altitude Radar Altimeter (Dual) |
| RV-18G |
|
Radio
Altimeter |
| ARM-15M |
|
ADF |
| ARK-U2 |
|
ADF |
| DISS-7 |
|
Doppler Nav |
| RSBN-PKV |
|
TACAN |
| R-832M |
|
UHF Comm |
| R-847 |
|
HF Comm |
| ARP-69 |
|
ILS |
| GRP/MRP-66 |
|
ILS |
|
|
|
| Leninets
PNA-D |
|
Attack Radar
|
| SMKRITs |
|
RORSAT
Targeting Datalink Receiver (Molniya satcom) |
| OPB-15T |
|
Remote
Optical Bombsight |
| AFA-15 |
|
Strike
Camera |
|
|
|
| Avtomat 3 |
|
Radar
Warning Receiver (Ural suite) |
| SPS-171/172 |
|
Defensive
ECM (Ural suite) |
| AG-56 |
|
ECM
Automatic Noise Generator (Ural suite) |
| L-082 MAK UL
|
|
IR Missile
Approach Warning System (Ural suite) |
| APP-50 |
|
Chaff/Flare
Dispenser (Ural) |
| PRS-4KM
Kripton |
|
Tail
Warning/Fire Control Radar |
| TP-1 |
|
Tail
Warning/Fire Control TV System |
| Table 1: |
Tu-22M3
Baseline Avionics/Systems (Stolar/Gordon/Rigmant) |
| Designation |
|
Type |
|
|
|
| 1 x Kh-22 |
|
Centreline
ASCM on BD-45F Adaptor |
| 2
x
Kh-22 |
|
Outboard
ASCM on BD-45K Adaptors |
| 6 x Kh-15 |
|
ASCM
on rotary launcher |
| 4 x Kh-15 |
|
ASCM
external stations |
| 6-8 x
Kh-55/65 |
|
ALCM
external stations |
| 1 x GSh-23 |
|
UKU-9A-802
barbette gun / 1200 rounds |
|
|
|
| BD-45F |
|
Weapons
Adaptor Kh-22 Centreline |
| BD-45K |
|
Weapons
Adaptor Kh-22 Wing Glove |
| MBD3-U9 |
|
Weapons
Adaptor |
| BD6-105A |
|
Weapons
Adaptor |
| KD3-22RD |
|
Weapons
Adaptor |
| KD-3-22M |
|
Weapons
Adaptor |
| KD4-105AD |
|
Weapons
Adaptor |
|
|
|
| 69 x FAB-100
|
|
250 lb dumb
bomb |
| 69 x FAB-250
|
|
500 lb dumb
bomb |
| 42 x FAB-500
|
|
1,000 lb
dumb bomb |
| 8 x FAB-1500
|
|
3,000 lb
dumb bomb |
| 2 x FAB-3000
|
|
6,000 lb
dumb bomb |
| 24 x
FAB-500/8 x FAB-1500 |
|
1,000
lb/3,000 lb dumb bomb |
| 24 x
FAB-500/1 x Kh-22 |
|
1,000 lb
dumb bomb/ASCM |
| 42 x 500 kg
naval mines |
|
- |
| 8 x 1500 kg
naval mines |
|
- |
| Table 2: |
Tu-22M3
Baseline Weapons (Stolar/Gordon/Rigmant) |
Comparison
of the Backfire C against the F-111, Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95MS Bear H

The Backfire sits between the
F-111 and B-1B in sizing and
capability, and with likely future weapons upgrades will provide
similar capabilities (Author).
This chart compares the strategic
punch of the Backfire
against tanker supported F-111s. To strategically balance a dozen
Backfires requires two dozen F-111s and a dozen supporting
KC-30B/A330-200MRTT
tankers. Without the F-111, the number of F/A-18As or JSFs is
effectively doubled, and tanker demands are nearly doubled. Should
useful
numbers of Backfires arrive in the region, the current plan for the
RAAF's force structure will result in a strategically irrelevant
RAAF strike capability (Author).


Backfire C Growth Paths
Sources in Eastern Europe observe that the Russian Air Force
has planned for some time to equip the Backfire C with a conventional
precision weapons capability, emulating the current trend pursued with
the US heavy bomber fleet. There are no reports as yet that this has
materialised, due to the parlous budgetary situation the Russians face.
With experience from the glass cockpit Su-27SKM and more recent Su-35BM
MLU package design,
there would be no issues for Russian designers in retrofitting a glass
cockpit.
It is very unlikely that Russia would agree to export the
Kh-55 / AS-15
Kent strategic cruise missile or the Kh-15A/R/S / AS-16 Kickback or
SRAM-ski as
part of an export package, although an anti-ship Kh-65 has been offered
for export. It is known that the PLA acquired samples of the Kh-55SM
via the Ukraine earlier in the decade.
Conventional variants of the Kh-22 were apparently offered
to India and would not present any major issues for export. Indeed, as
the PLA-AF and PLA-N both operate variants of the Styx/Silkworm which
use a closely related rocket engine and the same propellants, the Kh-22
would be very easy for the PLA to support and operate. We should not be
surprised if the PLA opts to licence build the Kh-22 as it could be
rapidly assimilated given the infrastructure to manufacture the
C-601/611. The Kh-22 remains a formidable anti-shipping weapon and with
precision guidance, an extremely potent land attack weapon.
Integration of the 1,000 lb KAB-500L and 3,000 lb KAB-1500L
Paveway-ski laser guided bombs would be relatively simple, exploiting
hardware for the FAB-1500. Adaptation of the existing nine round
FAB-250 rack to carry six KAB-500 is feasible. A thermal imaging laser
targeting pod like the Sapsan-E could be carried externally, but also
repackaged into the existing bombsight fairing under the flight deck,
exploiting the extant Weapons Officer's display for the remote OBP-15T
bombsight. The latter arrangement offers lower drag and a better field
of regard, but would require additional infra-red transmissive window
integration, yielding similar packaging to the JSF EOTS. Such as
arrangement is likely to be attractive as it doubles up as a day/night
thermal imaging sight to replace the OBP-15T, and with further
integration via a HUD could provide a night penetration capability.
Clearance of the fire-and-forget KAB-500/1500Kr GBU-8-ski
would present little difficulty, but inflight retargeting would require
wiring additions to the glove and ventral inlet stations. The
KAB-1500TK GBU-15-ski would require integration of the APK-9 Tekon pod,
already carried by the Su-30MKK and Su-27SKU.
The new GPS/Glonass aided inertially guided KAB-500S-E
'JDAM-ski' based on the KAB-500 kit is currently being
integrated on the Su-27SKM, Su-30MK and Su-35BM, with KAB-1500S-E
integration
now planned. These weapons would require software and wiring changes to
integrate, and would essentially replicate the capabilities of the JDAM
on US heavy bombers.
There are no fundamental obstacles to integrating the KAB
family weapons on the Backfire C, and the prospect of the PLA funding
such prior wishlist developments is likely to be very attractive to the
cash strapped RuAF. Arguably this may have been the motivation behind
senior RuAF officers publicly advocating the export of the Backfire to
China.
Indian sources claimed that the integration of the Kh-31/AS-17
Krypton series, adopted by the PLA-AF for the Su-30MKK, was a likely
prospect for the planned and later cancelled Indian Backfire C lease.
As an inventory
weapon for the PLA-AF, it is another likely development. Similar claims
were also made for the Kh-35U Kharpunski, and it also could be
integrated for tandem carriage on suitable launchers. A variant of the
existing bomb rack fitted with tandem AKU-58 launchers would easily
accommodate both the Kh-31 and Kh-35U in a low drag configuration.
It is to be expected that the PLA-AF would seek to carry its
planned ALCMs on the Backfire C. As these weapons are similar in size
and
weight to the FAB/KAB-1500 series, a similar external carriage
arrangement is to be expected. As the Chinese weapons will have unique
software requirements, it would likely be a later rather than earlier
addition to any export aircraft.
The PLA-AF already operates the podded L-005 Sorbtsiya and it
is likely that a block upgrade of the SPS-171/172 jammer would be
performed to bring them to a similar configuration. This would provide
considerable commonality in the support base, and in programming
jamming modes into the embedded firmware.
If a laser targeting system is fitted, there will be little
near term pressure to upgrade the attack radar system. The current
state of Russian multimode radar development is best exemplified by the
Leninetz B004 phased
array in the Su-34 Fullback, and the
Tihkomirov NIIP BARS and
newer Irbis E in the Su-30MK/35BM Flankers, all of which have
Ground/Maritime Moving Target Indicator and
Synthetic Aperture Radar high resolution mapping capabilities. A block
upgrade of the PNA-D signal and data processors vs replacement with a
derivative Su-30 radar would present an interesting dilemma for PLA-AF
planners. The stabilised gimbal and large radome volume present
considerable flexibility for retrofits. Of the choices available, the
most ambitious would clearly involve integrating a gimballed variant of
the Fullback's B004.
It is abundantly clear that the PLA-AF would have a wide range
of options in avionic block upgrades and weapons upgrades for the
Backfire C.
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